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FAMILY VALUES?: THE FAMILY AS AN
INNOCENT VICTIM OF CIVIL DRUG
ASSET FORFEITURE
Sandra Guerrat
[Flor I am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon
the children ....
INTRODUCTION
The peculiarly expansive reach of civil forfeiture laws has placed
the property of people not involved in the drug trade at risk of confis-
cation by the federal government. When a non-owner uses another's
property as the site for a drug offense,2 the owners must, to prevent
forfeiture of the property, prove to a federal court either that they had
no knowledge of any wrongdoing or that they did all they reasonably
could have done to prevent the illegal conduct. This is known as the
"innocent owner" defense.3 It forces federal courts to judge the ade-
quacy of property owners' behavior in policing the conduct of non-
owners with access to property used by the non-owners to commit a
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center. Assistant District
Attorney, NewYork County (Manhattan) 1988-90;J.D., Yale Law School, 1988. The author
owes a debt of gratitude to her colleague, Laura Oren of the University of Houston Law
Center, for her insightful comments on earlier drafts of this Article. The author wishes to
thank Laura DeSantos, John Goodgame, Andrew Hammel, SaraJankiewicz,Jeevan S. Per-
era, and Shannon Voll for their research assistance.
1 Exodus 20:5-6 (Revised Standard) (found in the first of the Ten Commandments
God spoke to Moses). This biblical notion has found its way into several literary works over
time. One of the earliest examples comes from the Greek playwright Euripides (c. 485-406
B.C.). The narrator tells of Heracles' killing of a young child, after which he yelled, "There
lies one.... One of Eurystheus' cubs has paid his father's debt." Euiupmxs, HERcLs,
MEDEA AND OTHER PLAYS 183, fragment 970 (Philip Vellacott, trans., Penguin Books 1963).
This biblical passage also finds its way into the Shakespearean work, The Merchant of Venice,
in which Launcelot tellsJessica that she will be treated with no mercy in heaven because
her father is ajew. He tells her, "Yes, truly; for, look you, the sins of the father are to be
laid upon the children: therefore, I promise ye I fear [for] you." WILtAM SHAREsPEARE,
MERCHANT OF VENICE AT 11 act 3, sc. 5, at 92 (George Coffin Taylor & Reed Smith eds.,
Ginn & Co. 1936).
2 For a discussion of the federal drug asset forfeiture laws, see infra notes 70-95 and
accompanying text.
3 SeeAnthonyJ. Franze, Note, Casualties of War?: Drugs, Civil Forfeiture, and the Plight of
the "Innocent Owner, "70 NoaR DAME L. REv. 369 (1994); Lalit K. Loomba, Note, The Inno-
cent Owner Defense to Real Propery Forfeiture Under the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984,
58 FoRDHAtm L REv. 471 (1989); see also infra notes 96-136 and accompanying text.
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drug violation. In the context of the family, this civil forfeiture regime
has generated some troublesome rulings.
The Second Circuit's decision in United States v. 19 & 25 Castle
Street4 prompted this examination of the role of the family vis-a-vis the
government in criminal investigations and prosecutions. In 19 & 25
Castle Street, the federal government seized the family home of Jos6
and Virginia Gonzalez because their adult children possessed narcot-
ics on the premises.5 The court found that the Gonzalezes were not
"innocent owners" because they had "failed to undertake every rea-
sonable means of preventing the narcotics activity at the residence."6
The court stated:
Although [the Gonzalezes] were hesitant to do so because drug
dealers had retaliated against them for informing the police about
narcotics activity in the neighborhood, it would not have been un-
reasonable for them to ask the police to take some action in regard
to the narcotics activity at their dwelling. [Furthermore,] Mr. and
Mrs. Gonzalez could have given their adult children an ultimatum:
Comply with the law or move out. 7
The court permitted the government to take the most important fam-
ily asset-the homestead-from an apparently hardworking, law-
abiding couple simply because the court felt that they had failed in
their duties as citizens either to report their children to the police or
to throw them out of the house.
In addition to the parent-child scenario, another common situa-
tion in which families face civil forfeiture concerns a drug-dealing hus-
band, an uninvolved wife, and their children.8 These cases raise
different issues than the parent-child cases in that they involve marital
property laws and marital relations,9 but the ultimate legal question is
similar: did the wife take all reasonable steps to prevent her hus-
band's illegal activity? The very question ought to give courts pause;
the forfeiture laws have placed courts in the awkward position of de-
termining the appropriateness of a wife's conduct toward her hus-
band within a home that they jointly own.
4 31 F.3d 35 (2d Cir. 1994).
5 For a full discussion of this decision, see infra notes 190-222 and accompanying
text.
6 19 & 25 Castle St., 31 F.3d at 40.
7 Id.
8 This Article uses the term "uninvolved" rather than "innocent" because under the
"innocent owner" defense, owners are adjudged guilty if they have knowledge of and are
deemed to have consented to unlawful conduct on their property, even if they are not
sufficiently involved to be charged with a drug offense themselves. See infra notes 96-136
and accompanying text (discussing the "innocent owner" defense).




The application of civil forfeiture law within the family is a new
legal development. For the first time, this system imposes duties on
family members to act as police officers in their own homes. Parents
and spouses are expected to report their relatives' violations to the
police, search their relatives' possessions for contraband, evict their
children or divorce their spouses, and otherwise cooperate with the
authorities. 10 By requiring family members to police each other or
risk the loss of the family's assets, the law eliminates other options
family members may have for dealing with relatives who have gone
astray.11
This Article considers the following question: What should the
duties of uninvolved family members be toward loved ones who take
part in illegal activities and, in particular, in drug crimes? Where, in
other words, should the boundaries of familial privacy-that sphere
beyond which the government should not transgress, even in the
name of truth andjustice-be drawn? The law has long struggled to
define the parameters of family privacy and the corresponding limits
on governmental authority to regulate conduct within the home. 12
What is striking about the civil forfeiture cases involving family mem-
bers is, however, the universal failure of courts even to recognize that
the rules in this area constitute an unprecedented intrusion by the
government into private familial relations. Moreover, the number of
family home forfeitures is likely to increase as the federal govern-
ment's "war on drugs" continues its steady and dramatic growth and
becomes increasingly sophisticated.' 3
Part I of this Article addresses the historical treatment of the fam-
ily in criminal law enforcement. Part H examines the use of civil for-
feiture in drug cases. Part III assesses the duties imposed on
uninvolved family members under that regime, and Part IV evaluates
the importance of shielding family relations from governmental intru-
sion that may threaten the viability of such relationships. The Article
10 The "all reasonable steps" requirement applies to many other categories of prop-
erty owners, including landlords whose tenants may bring drugs onto the property, banks
whose clients may deposit drug proceeds, and individuals who do business together. See,
e.g., United States v. One 1973 Rolls Royce, 43 F.3d 794 (3d Cir. 1994) (defense attorney);
United States v. 141st St. Corp., 911 F.2d 870 (2d Cir. 1990) (apartment building owners),
cert. denied 498 U.S. 1109 (1991); United States v. 3100 N.E. 48th St., Unit 618, 871 F. Supp.
437 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (bail bond company); United States v. 2639 Meetinghouse Rd., 633 F.
Supp. 979 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (business partners). Property owners who do business with peo-
ple they suspect to deal in drugs "do so at their own risk." United States v. 15603 85th Ave.,
933 F.2d 976, 982 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v. $4,255,000, 762 F.2d 895, 905 (11th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1056 (1986).
11 Other options may exist for families in higher socioeconomic classes. For a discus-
sion of incidental class bias in the application of the civil forfeiture process, see infra part
IV.
12 See infra notes 17-69 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 74-81 and accompanying text.
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concludes by proposing a number of alternatives to the current civil
forfeiture regime that would relieve uninvolved family members from
the ancient "double bind" of loyalty to the government versus loyalty
to the family14 without creating a sanctuary for criminal activity.
I
THE LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS IN THE
ENFORCEMENT OF CRIMINAL LAW
Generally speaking, the preservation of family relationships and
the administration of justice are at odds when one family member
commits a crime and another has knowledge of it. In some situations,
the uninvolved family member may find that the family's interests co-
incide with those of law enforcement. In many other situations, how-
ever, the family member may believe that the errant relative's
brightest prospect for long term rehabilitation involves avoiding crimi-
nal prosecution. As this Part will demonstrate, the law has long recog-
nized the importance of family relationships, and the goals of law
enforcement have yielded to society's interest in maintaining those
bonds. In particular, this Part will examine the American legal tradi-
tion that protects the sanctity of the home and the rights of individu-
als "to be let alone"' 5 by the government, and the criminal laws that
specifically recognize and protect the parent-child and marital
relationships.
A. The Right "To Be Let Alone" and Family Privacy
Various provisions of the Bill of Rights crdate a sphere of privacy
and autonomy for individuals, especially within their homes.16 The
14 The predicament of having to choose between government and family serves as the
theme of the ancient Greek play Antigone by Sophocles. Antigone defies the edict of
Creon, King of Thebes, forbidding the burial of her brother Polynices whom the King
considers a traitor. Antigone tells her sister Ismene who refuses to help Antigone:
I will bury him myself.
If I die for doing that, good:
I will stay with him, my brother;
and my crime will be devotion.
SOPHOCLES, ANIGONE lines 87-90, at 23 (Richard Emil Braun trans., Oxford Univ. Press
1973). In the end, Antigone is put to death for her actions. Id. lines 710-40, at 44-45.
15 See infra note 21 and accompanying text.
16 The Supreme Court has on numerous other occasions addressed the constitutional
protection of individual autonomy and privacy in personal relationships and in the home.
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992) ("It is a promise of the
Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty which the government may not
enter."); Roberts v. United StatesJaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984) ("The Bill of Rights...
must afford the formation and preservation of certain kinds of highly personal relation-
ships a substantial measure of sanctuary from unjustified interference by the State."); Oli-
ver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984) (The home "provide[s] the setting for those
intimate activities that the [Fourth] Amendment is intended to shelter from government
interference or surveillance."); United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 142 (1973) ("The Con-
346 [Vol. 81:343
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division between the public realm and the privacy of the home reflects
the post-revolution laissez faire tradition that safeguards individual
rights from governmental interference. 17 The Supreme Court's "con-
stitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the parents'
claim to authority in their own household to direct the rearing of
their children is basic in the structure of our society."'
8
The rights of individuals to privacy in their "persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects," as well as in their thoughts and beliefs, receive
greatest protection from the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.' 9 Simply
stitution extends special safeguards to the privacy of the home, just as it protects other
special privacy rights such as those of marriage, procreation, motherhood, child rearing
and education.").
17 Legal historian Michael Grossberg chronicles the profound changes experienced
by the American family and its relationship to the state from colonial times to the post-
revolutionary period. MIcHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY
IN NINETEENTH-CErURY AMERIcA 3-80 (1985). The changes in the economic and political
systems of post-revolutionary America are reflected in the transition of the family from a
public to a private institution. Grossberg writes:
Led by middle-class households, families began to shed their public, mul-
tifunctional forms and stand apart in an increasingly segregated, private
realm of society.
The family and the outside world came to be viewed as separate entities,
often pictured as bitter adversaries.
Under the sway of republican theory and culture, the home and the
polity displayed striking similarities. These included a deep aversion to un-
accountable authority and unchecked governmental activism. ... [and] a
commitment to self-government.... Most important, the American family,
like the republican polity, suffered from the uncertainties of sovereignty
and from the pressures. of democratization and marketplace values un-
leashed by the Revolution's egalitarian and laissez faire ideology.
Id. at 6-7. In time, "families became less and less willing to sacrifice domestic autonomy to
the dictates of communal supervision." Id. at 5. Reciprocally, "[plublic officials were in-
creasingly reluctant to curb generation or gender rebellions with the weapons of commu-
nity authority." I. at 6. Quoting literary analystJay Fliegelman, Grossberg suggests that
"[t]he American revolution against patriarchal authority in the second half of the eight-
eenth century provided the paradigm by which Americans for the next two hundred years
would understand and set forth the claims of both individual and national independence."
Id. at 7.
18 Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968).
19 The Fourth Amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONsT. amend. IV. The Fifth Amendment states: "No person shall.., be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law, nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616, 630 (1886) (describing the Fourth and Fifth Amendments as protecting against all
unreasonable governmental invasions "of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of
life").
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stated, the Constitution permits law enforcement officials to do their
jobs but insists that in doing so they respect the privacy of each indi-
vidual and that of families within the home.20 Justice Brandeis, in his
famous dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United States, said it best:
"The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness.... They conferred, as against
the government, the ight to be let alone-the most comprehensive of
rights and the right most valued by civilized men."21 Thus, the Fourth
Amendment prohibits the police from making warrantless entries into
one's home to make an arrest or to search for evidence of a crime.2 2
Indeed, the Court has interpreted the Amendment to reach the inva-
sion of any place or thing in which a person has a "reasonable expec-
tation of privacy" from government interference, whether or not it
involves physical invasion. 23
The Fifth Amendment protects, among other things, the right of
the individual to remain silent in the face of criminal accusations by
the government.24 Although it would arguably be more expedient for
the government to demand that individuals produce whatever evi-
dence they may have that would either incriminate or exonerate
them, the Constitution instead protects the individual's right to pri-
vacy and provides an accused a privilege against self-incrimination and
presumes that he is innocent until proven guilty.2
Furthermore, in a long line of cases, the Supreme Court has in-
terpreted the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
20 For example, the majority opinion in Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980),
citing a lower court decision, observes that "[a] greater burden is placed.., on officials
who enter a home or dwelling without consent. Freedom from intrusion into the home or
dwelling is the archetype of the privacy protection secured by the Fourth Amendment." Id.
at 587 (citing Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385, 389 (D.C. Cir. 1970)).
21 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
22 Payton, 445 U.S. at 588-89 (warrantless entry to effectuate a felony arrest is imper-
missible as is warrantless entry to search for evidence).
23 In Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967), the Supreme Court abolished a
rule that granted Fourth Amendment protection only to physical intrusions into certain
protected places, like the home. The Katz Court considered the legality of government
eavesdropping on a telephone call placed from a public phone booth. Declaring that "the
Fourth Amendment protects people-and not simply areas," the Court determined that
"the reach of that Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical
intrusion into any given enclosure." Id. Rather, the Court found that a person who places
a call from inside a telephone booth "is surely entitled to assume that the words he utters
into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world." Id. at 352.
24 See Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 304 (1981) (explaining the right of a defen-
dant in a criminal trial to remain silent); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 455 (1966)
(requiring that the police warn criminal suspects of their right to remain silent before
extracting a confession because "the very fact of custodial interrogation exacts a heavy toll
on individual liberty and trades on the weakness of individuals").
25 See infra note 30 and accompanying text.
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create a "private realm of family life which the State cannot enter."26
In Meyer v. Nebraska, for example, the Court described the liberty guar-
anteed by the Fourteenth Amendment as encompassing: "the right...
to many, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God
according to the dictates of [one's] own conscience, and generally to
enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to
the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."27 The Supreme Court
has similarly recognized the "liberty of parents and guardians to direct
the upbringing and education of children under their control."28
This jurisprudence "establish[es] that the Constitution protects the
sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the family is
deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."29
This laissez faire tradition also manifests itself in American crimi-
nal law. Although criminal law generally prohibits bad behavior, it
rarely requires any affirmative action.30 Criminal law ordinarily pun-
ishes only culpable acts, not culpable omissions, unless the omission
involves a failure to perform a legally recognized and voluntarily-
assumed duty to act 3' For example, if an injured individual needs
immediate medical assistance, a stranger to that individual has, under
26 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). The Seventh Circuit has viewed
this jurisprudence as divisible into two categories. United States v. Davies, 768 F.2d 893,
897 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1008 (1985). The first group of cases challenges
the constitutionality of state intrusion into the structure or definition of the family. Id. at
898 n.2 (citing cases). The second group of cases involves the right to make important
family decisions. Id. at 898 n.3 (citing cases).
27 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (citations omitted).
28 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); see also Bellotti v. Baird, 443
U.S. 622, 638 (1979) (observing that one of the basic presuppositions of the American
"tradition of individual liberty" is the maintenance of parental authority); Stanley v. Illi-
nois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (noting that the Constitution protects the integrity of the
family unit and the essential right to raise one's children); P1rince 321 U.S. at 166 ("It is
cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents,
whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can
neither supply nor hinder.").
29 Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
30 See Daniel B. Yeager, A Radical Community of Aid: A Rejoinder to Opponents of Affirma-
tive Duties to Help Strangers, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 9 (1993). Consistent with this approach is
the policy that the law presumes a person accused of a crime to be innocent until the
government satisfies its burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The law does
not require an accused to take action to defend himself or herself, the government bears
the entire burden. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (holding that the Due
Process Clause requires the government to prove a defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt); see generally WAYNE R. LAFAvE & AusTIN W. ScoTT, J., CRIMINAL LAW §3.3 (2d ed.
1986) [hereinafter LAFAvE & Scorr] (explaining theories of criminal omissions in Ameri-
can law).
31 The law recognizes at least five situations in which one has a duty to act such that
failure to act may be punished as a crime: (1) where a statute imposes a duty to act; (2)
where one stands in a certain status relationship to another; (3) where one has assumed a
contractual duty to act; (4) where one has voluntarily assumed a duty to care for another
and has secluded the helpless person thereby preventing others from rendering aid; (5)
where one has created the peril. See LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 30, § 3.3(a), at 203-07; see
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American law, no legal duty to render aid, even if he or she could do
so without creating any danger to him or herself.32 The hypothetical
example of the child lying face down in a puddle and the passerby
who refuses to turn the child's head to prevent her from drowning
provokes angry responses and an instinctive desire to punish the pass-
erby. Fortunately, however, few horrific instances of such callous be-
havior have actually occurred in American history.33 In most cases,
people will help one another and provide assistance out of a sense of
civic responsibility and moral obligation. On balance, American crim-
inal law reflects a preference for punishing only bad acts and not the
failure to do good.
If the law does not require an individual to provide assistance to a
dying person, one might expect that it should not require an individ-
ual to provide assistance to law enforcement, even if he or she can do
so without creating any danger to himself or herself. The criminal law
adopts this view with only a few exceptions.3 4 Traditional criminal law
alsoJones v. United States, 808 F.2d 307, 310 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (discussing the duty of a
guardian to safeguard the health of an infant child).
32 American law differs from that of Eastern and Western Europe. Since the Russian
Criminal Code of 1845, nearly every continental European country has called on its citi-
zens to act as good samaritans and render aid to others in jeopardy if they can do so
without endangering themselves. SeeJohn KIeinig, Good Samaritanism, 5 PHIL & PUB. AFF.
382, 385 (1975).
In the United States, state laws typically absolve good samaritans from civil liability for
aid they render to persons in danger, Diane Kiesel, Who Saw This Happen? States Move to
Make Crime Bystanders Responsible, 69 A.B.A. J. 1208, 1208 (1983), but they do not require
people to help others, even if they can do so in complete safety. Kleinig, supra, at 385.
Minnesota and Vermont have, however, criminalized the failure to act as a good samaritan.
See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604A.01 (West Supp. 1996) ("A person at the scene of an emer-
gency who knows that another person is exposed to or has suffered grave physical harm
shall, to the extent that the person can do so without danger or peril to self or others, give
reasonable assistance to the exposed person."); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (1973):
A person who knows that another is exposed to grave physical harm shall,
to the extent that the same can be rendered without danger or peril to
himself or without interference with important duties owed to others, give
reasonable assistance to the exposed person unless that assistance or care is
being provided by others.
33 But see Kiesel, supra note 32, at 1208-09 (recounting the gang rape of a woman in a
Massachusetts tavern while patrons gaped and cheered, and the stabbing death of a New
York City woman while neighbors watched, from the safety of their homes, for 80 minutes
before calling the police).
34 A few states statutorily require citizens to report crimes to the police. For example,
many states require drivers involved in auto accidents to stop, furnish identification and
render aid. See David R. Bonelli, Annotation, Sufficiency of Showing of Driver's Involvement in
Motor Vehicle Accident to Support Prosecution for Failure to Stop, Furnish Identification, or Render
Aid, 82 A.L.R 4TH 232 (1990). All 50 states, the District of Columbia, and the Virgin
Islands have enacted a statute of some form requiring doctors, teachers, and other classes
of persons to report their suspicions of child abuse. See Danny R. Veilleux, Annotation,
Validity, Construction, and Application of State Statutes Requiring Doctor or Other Person to Report
Child Abuse, 73 A.L.R. 4TH 782, 789-91 (1989). A landowner, moreover, has a duty to inter-
vene if a violent crime is being perpetrated against a third-person invitee of the landowner,
if the landowner can do so without placing himself or herself in danger. See supra note 31
[Vol. 81:343
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principles generally do not require individuals to act as citizen-police
when they have information concerning the commission of a crime.
If a person has specific knowledge concerning the commission of a
crime-even a felony-the person does not, as a result of this knowl-
edge, have a legal duty to report the offense to the authorities or
otherwise to intervene to prevent it.35
These principles apply equally to family members and unrelated
individuals. When one family member in a household commits a
crime, other family members will likely learn of it, if due only to the
proximity of their living quarters. The uninvolved family members
may obtain specific knowledge of a crime or merely general knowl-
edge of some wrongdoing. This knowledge does not, however, create
a duty to act. If a teenage or adult child possesses child pornography
in his parents' home, for example, only the child is punishable. Even
if his or her parents are aware of the child's conduct and do not alert
the authorities, the parents would suffer no criminal punishment or
other penalty3 6 Although one may have moral qualms concerning
the parents' failure to take action, their omission is not legally punish-
able.3 7 The parents have no legal duty to report the crime,38 to con-
duct random searches of the home for illegal pornography, or to evict
the child upon learning that he or she has violated the law.
and accompanying text. At a minimum, one would expect the property owner to call the
police.
35 The crime of misprision under English common law imposed a duty on citizens to
prevent the commission of a crime or, having knowledge of its commission, to reveal it to
the proper authorities. 4 WiuLsM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 119-26. Every man was
bound, "under pain of punishment, to make himself an informer as to any treason or
felony that he may have witnessed or that came to his knowledge." 21 AM.JUR. 2D Criminal
Law § 84 (1981 & Supp. 1995).
American criminal law derives in large part from English common law, but the offense
of misprision rarely, if ever, found its way into American courts. In Pope v. State, 396 A.2d
1054, 1078 (Md. 1979), the Maryland Court of Appeals overturned a guilty verdict for
common-law misprision, holding that the offense is not indictable. The court cited author
P.R. Glazebrook for the proposition that "[n]o court in the United States has been pre-
pared to adopt the English doctrine in its simplicity, and hold that a mere failure to dis-
close knowledge of a felony is itself an offence." Id. at 1070 (citing P.R. Glazebrook, How
Long, Then, is the Arm of the Law to be?, 25 MoD. L. REv. 301, 307 n.51 (1962)). See generally
P.R. Glazebrook, Misprision ofFelony-Shadow orPhantom, 8 AM.J. LEGAL Hisr. 189 (1964)
(surveying the English legal history of misprision); cf. infra note 46 (discussing the federal
misprision statute).
36 See supra text accompanying note 34.
a7 The most recent United States Supreme Court decision addressing misprision
viewed the defendant's failure to disclose known criminal activity as a badge of irresponsi-
ble citizenship and characterized the reporting of a crime as a "social obligation." Roberts
v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 558 (1980).
8 The Seventh Circuit has observed that "unlike [a] probation officer... [a] father is
not a state employee duty bound to report his son's wrongdoing." United States ex reL
Riley v. Frazen, 653 F.2d 1153, 1160 (7th Cir.) (referring to Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S.
707 (1979)), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1067 (1981).
1996]
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Similarly, although police officers may, upon obtaining informa-
tion that an individual has committed a crime, question the child's
parents, the parents may refuse to answer. In United States v. Menden-
ha/, the Supreme Court acknowledged this right in the context of po-
lice encounters that culminated in the arrest of the persons
questioned.3 9 The Court ruled that police officers have a right, like
that of any other citizen, to question individuals. 4° Justice White ar-
ticulated this so-called "right-to-inquire" rule in Florida v. Roye. "Law
enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment by merely
approaching an individual on the street or in another public place, by
asking him if he is willing to answer some questions, by putting ques-
tions to him if the person is willing to listen ... -41 Police may ask
whatever questions they like of whomever they choose-even without
any suspicion of wrongdoing. However, the person accosted has the
reciprocal right-as is true in any citizen-to-citizen encounter-to ig-
nore the questioner and walk away. The Royer opinion states:
[A person] need not answer any question put to him; indeed he
may decline to listen to questions at all and may go on his way. He
may not be detained even momentarily without reasonable, objec-
tive grounds for doing so; and his refusal to listen or answer does
not, without more, furnish those grounds.42
Thus, a police officer may approach a person on the street, by tele-
phone, or at the threshold of his or her home and question the indi-
vidual regarding a criminal investigation. The person approached
may, however, choose to speak or not to speak. The Supreme Court
has referred to such police-citizen discussions as "classic consensual
encounters."43
When the suspect is one's son or daughter, even the courts have
acknowledged the important role played by the parent as a quasi-legal
39 446 U.S. 544 (1980). The issue the Court faced was whether the questioning trans-
formed the encounter into a "seizure" for purposes of the Fourth Amendment in which
case the police would need a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing. Id. at 553-54.
40 Id. at 553. In his concurring opinion in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 34-35 (1967),
Justice White emphasized that a police officer is always free to ask questions of citizens on
the street, but "[aibsent special circumstances, [such as those found in Terry], the person
approached may not be detained or frisked but may refuse to cooperate and go on his
way." See also id. at 32-33 (Harlan, J., concurring) (arguing that a police officer has "the
liberty (again, possessed by every citizen) to address questions to other persons, for ordina-
rily the person addressed has an equal right to ignore his interrogator and walk away").
For a helpful discussion of the origins of the right-to-inquire rule, see Tracy Maclin, The
Decline of the Right of Locomotion: The Fourth Amendment on the Streets, 75 CoRNm.L L. Rnv.
1258, 1266-70 (1990); see also Charles A. Reich, Police Questioning of Law Abiding Citizens, 75
YALE LJ. 1161 (1966) (suggesting the institutionalization of police questioning procedures
to curb discrimination and to protect privacy rights).
41 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983) (plurality opinion).
42 Id. at 498 (citations omitted).
43 Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 221 (1984).
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advisor to the child.44 Addressing the significance of a parent's advi-
sory role during a custodial interrogation of his or her child, the Sew
enth Circuit commented that a parent may choose not to report a
child's confession to the police: "Even a lay parent [as opposed to a"
parent who happens to be an attorney] . .. may not encourage the
suspect to talk with the police or feel bound to report any confession
which the child may make in confidence."45
For family members who share a home with a person who com-
mits a crime, however, the dividing line between lawful and unlawful
conduct can seem very fine. If family members take positive steps to
conceal the crime, such as giving false statements to the police, they
risk conviction for the crime of misprision, obstruction of justice, or
giving false statements to the authorities.4 Providing shelter to a
criminal or otherwise helping an offender avoid arrest may constitute
44 See infra note 60 and accompanying text.
45 United States ex rel. Riley v. Franzen, 653 F.2d 1153, 1160 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1067 (1981).
46 The federal misprision statute reads:
[Wihoever, having knowledge of the actual commission of a felony cogniza-
ble by a court of the United States, conceals and does not as soon as possi-
ble make known the same to some judge or other person in civil or military
authority under the United States, shall be fined under this title or impris-
oned not more than three years, or both.
18 U.S.C-A. § 4 (West Supp. 1996). Misprision requires an affirmative act to conceal the
crime. See, e.g., United States v. Ciambrone, 750 F.2d 1416, 1417 (9th Cir. 1984); United
States v. Baez, 732 F.2d 780, 782 (10th Cir. 1984); Lancey v. United States, 356 F.2d 407,
409 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 922 (1966); see also supra note 35 (addressing the
English common-law crime of misprision).
Not surprisingly, many of the misprision cases involve people related to the person
who committed the predicate crime. Older federal cases frequently involved bank robber-
ies. See, e.g., United States v. Gravitt, 590 F.2d 123 (5th Cir. 1979) (bank robbery); United
States v. King, 402 F.2d 694 (7th Cir. 1968) (defendant erroneously charged with mispri-
sion for concealing information regarding bank robbery committed by his brother);
Lancey, 356 F.2d at 407 (husband and wife defendants harbored a bank robber); United
States v. Trigilio, 255 F.2d 385 (2d Cir. 1958) (defendant concealed brother-in-law's bank
robbery).
Nearly all of the more recent cases involve drug-related crimes and often involve a wife
or girlfriend possessing drugs or drug proceeds. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 32 F.3d
563 (4th Cir. 1994) (girlfriend of drug dealer convicted of misprision and money launder-
ing); United States v. Braggs, 16 F.3d 417 (10th Cir. 1994) (after directing common-law
wife to hold drugs in her bra while police searched residence, her drug dealer husband
later informed police that she possessed the drugs); United States v. Wilkes, 972 F.2d 344
(4th Cir.) (defendant's brothers ran a drug importation and distribution ring, she har-
bored her brothers from police and gave them money to flee), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1025
(1992); United States v. Adams, 961 F.2d 505 (5th Cir. 1992) (defendant's drug dealer
boyfriend purchased a house for her with drug proceeds). The federal criminal code pros-
cribes "Obstruction of proceedings before departments, agencies, and committees." 18
U.S.C. § 1505 (1994). It also makes it a felony to give false statements to federal law en-
forcement. See 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994); United States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475 (1984)
(applying false statements law to law enforcement).
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harboring a fugitive or other similar offenses.47 Of course, if the fam-
ily members played an active role in furtherance of the offense itself,
they could be charged as accomplices.
In short, American law generally imposes no duties on citizens to
behave as police officers, either within their homes or in public. Citi-
zens ordinarily need not report offenses, provide infonnation to the
police, or otherwise take measures to prevent the commission of
crimes. They are expected to cooperate with the police voluntarily, as
a matter of civic duty. In intrafamily situations, however, by shielding
domestic life from public scrutiny, the law has effectively granted indi-
vidual family members the right to decide how best to respond to
their loved one's misconduct.48
B. Legal Rules that Specifically Protect Family Relationships
Some legal rules specifically address family relationships and
their significance in the enforcement of criminal laws. In fact, such
rules often place a higher priority on the preservation of family rela-
tionships than on the efficiency of the justice system. The few laws
that explicitly protect the family do so in one of two ways: (1) by pre-
serving the bond of legal marriage, or (2) by promoting the well-being
of children.
First, the common law has long recognized the importance of
protecting the institution of marriage.49 Although people with infor-
mation pertaining to a crime can generally be compelled to testify
before a grand jury or during a criminal trial,50 the rules of evidence
47 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 792 (1994) (harboring and concealing persons suspected of
espionage); id. § 1071 (concealing persons from arrest); id. § 1072 (concealing an escaped
prisoner).
48 See infra part IV.
49 Earlier in our history, a number of criminal statutes sought to curb sexual behavior
that was considered inconsistent with the "natural" practices of legally married couples.
Laws against fornication, adultery, the use of birth control, sodomy, and abortion confined
lawful sexual relations and reproductive practices to those ostensibly practiced by tradi-
tional, natural families. Such laws were widely viewed as extremely intrusive, and most have
either been repealed by the state legislatures or struck down by the Supreme Court as
unconstitutional. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (striking down a criminal law
against abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (overturning prohibition on the
distribution of contraceptives to unmarried people); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965) (striking down prohibition of contraceptive use by married people). But see Bowers
v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding the constitutionality of a state sodomy
statute).
50 During the prosecution phase of a criminal case, a tribunal may compel citizens to
testify for the government or the defense. A party has the power to compel testimony of a
wimess by issuing a subpoena testificandum which requires a person to appear in court and
testify. Refusal to appear or to testify may result in an adjudication of contempt which
usually results in a period of confinement. See genera~ly Note, Coercive Confinement and the
Federal GrandJuwy, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 735 (1979) (surveying the historical background of
coercive contempt citations against recalcitrant grand jury witnesses).
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create two exceptions for spouses. The first, known as the "adverse
testimony privilege," grants them the privilege to refuse to testify
against one another. The second privilege permits a spouse to testify
without revealing spousal confidences. 5' Legally-recognized marriage
is the only family relationship that has traditionally been shielded by
the privilege rules, 52 and then only under narrowly-drawn
circumstances. 53
The Supreme Court has cited the prevention of marital discord as
the primary rationale for the adverse spousal testimony privilege,54
and courts have touted the privilege against revealing marital confi-
dences as a means of encouraging openness in marital discussions.55
Thus, the rules are designed to preserve the bond of marriage and to
ensure that the partners in a marital relationship feel comfortable
sharing intimate secrets, even if those secrets concern a spouse's ille-
gal activities. The law does not impose a duty on the spouse receiving
such information to violate that trust.
Second, the law recognizes that parents have certain rights and
responsibilities regarding the well-being of their children.56 Tradi-
tionally, the law viewed children as helpless dependents of their par-
ents who required nurturing, guidance, and protection. 57 This
51 See generally Developments in the Law: Privileged Communications, 98 HARv. L. REv.
1450, 1565-74 (1985) [hereinafter Developments] (discussing marital privileges).
52 Unmarried partners, even if they have long held themselves out as husband and
wife, may not invoke the spousal privileges. See, e.g., United States v. Lustig, 555 F.2d 737
(9th Cir. 1977) (upholding district court's rejection of spousal privilege for defendant's
unmarried partner because the state did not recognize common-law marriages), cert. de-
nied, 434 U.S. 1045 (1978); United States v. White, 545 F.2d 1129 (8th Cir. 1976) (same); In
re Ms. X, 562 F. Supp. 486 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (holding that an unmarried couple who held
themselves out as husband and wife for years and who had four children could not invoke
spousal privilege). In In reMatthews v. United States, 714 F.2d 223, 225 (2d Cir. 1983), the
Second Circuit declined to recognize a "family privilege" not to testify against in-laws, stat-
ing, "the marital bliss of Lawrence and Denise Matthews will have to endure whatever
strains might result from his testimony against his in-laws." Similarly, the privilege not to
testify does not extend to siblings or more remote relations. See United States v. (Under
Seal) In re Antitrust Grand Jury Investigation, 714 F.2d 347, 349 (4th Cir.) (implicitly re-
jecting an adverse testimony privilege for brother and cousin of defendant), cert. dismissed,
464 U.S. 978 (1983).
53 See supra note 52.
54 Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 52 (1980) (finding that adverse testimony
privilege belongs to witness-spouse because if witness is willing to testify against spouse,
"their relationship is almost certainly in disrepair, there is probably little in the way of
marital harmony for the privilege to preserve").
55 See Developments, supra note 51, at 1579.
56 This discussion also applies to guardians who have voluntarily assumed the duties
of parents in becoming guardians.
57 J. AREEN, FAMILY LAW. CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW 864-958 (2d ed. 1985);
H. CLARM, THE LAW OF DOMESrIc RELATIONS 241-42 (1968); M. GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY
AND THE NEW PROPERTY 36-40 (1981); M. GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND
THE FAMILY IN NNETEENTH-CENTuRY AMERICA 8 (1985); Martha Minow, "Forming Underneath
Everything that Grows": Toward a History of Family Law, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 819, 833; see also H.
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perspective persists to some extent in the rules applicable to criminal
law enforcement. 58 For example, the law punishes parents who fail to
provide adequate care to, or who otherwise harm, their children. 59
The law also supports the role of the parent as advisor and confidante
of the child. In many state juvenile justice systems, parents are al-
lowed to accompany their children as advisors during custodial inter-
rogations. In these states, prosecutors cannot use a juvenile's
confession unless a parent was present when the police obtained it.60
Once the criminal proceedings reach the point of a grand jury
investigation or a trial, the protection for the parent-child relationship
ceases in most states. Only a few states have found that the compelled
testimony of a parent concerning the child's confidential communica-
tions might be detrimental to the parent's role as confidante and advi-
sor.61 Courts in these jurisdictions have expressed concerns that
COHEN, EQUAL RIGHTS FOR CHILDREN 1-27 (1980) (discussing the notion of children's
rights).
58 The criminal law has become more punitive with regard to crimes committed by
children. See generally Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Punish-
ment, Treatment, and the Difference It Makes, 68 B.U. L. REv. 821 (1988) (analyzing the sen-
tencing practices of juvenile courts); Martin L. Forst & Martha-ElMin Blomquist, Cracking
Down on Juveniles: The Changing Ideology of Youth Corrections, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL'Y 323 (1991) (proposing changes in the legal framework of the juvenile justice
system); see also Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (upholding the application of
the death penalty to 16-year olds).
59 See 39 Am.Jua. Parent and Child § 46 (1942):
It is the right and duty of parents under the law of nature as well as the
common law and the statutes of many states to protect their children, to
care for them in sickness and in health, and to do whatever may be neces-
sary for their care, maintenance, and preservation, including medical at-
tendance, if necessary. An omission to do this is a public wrong which the
state, under its police powers, may prevent.
See also Walter Wadlington, Medical Decision Making for and by Children: Tensions Between
Parent, State, and Chil" 1994 U. ILL L. REv. 311 (discussing decision-making authority for
medical decisions concerning children).
60 See, e.g., People v. Saiz, 620 P.2d 15, 19 (Colo. 1980) (quoting COLO. REv. STAT.
§ 19-2-102(3) (c) (I) (1973)); Lewis v. State, 288 N.E.2d 138, 142 (Ind. 1972). But seePeople
v. Lara, 432 P.2d 202 (Cal. 1967) (en banc), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 945 (1968); State v.
Young, 552 P.2d 905 (Kan. 1976); Theriault v. State, 223 N.W.2d 850, 854 nn.11, 12 (Wis.
1974).
61 In New York, the courts have created a parent-child privilege. See In re A & M, 403
N.Y.S.2d 375, 378 (App. Div. 1978) (finding a parent-child privilege based on family pri-
vacy and psychological evidence, asking "Shall it be said to ... parents, 'Listen to your son
at the risk of being compelled to testify about his confidences?'"); People v. Fitzgerald, 422
N.Y.S.2d 309, 313 (Westchester County Ct. 1979) (finding that a privilege exists for an
adult child's communication to a parent since "[t]he parent-child relationship of mutual
trust and confidence.., is one that should be and must be fostered throughout the life of
the parties"); cf. In re Mark G., 410 N.Y.S.2d 464 (App. Div. 1978) (affirming the lower
court's rejection of privilege because statement was not made in confidence for the pur-
pose of obtaining advice and support).
The Idaho and Minnesota legislatures statutorily provide a limited parent-child privi-
lege, applying only to a minor child's confidential statements to a parent. See IDAHO CODE
§ 9-203(7) (1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(j) (West 1995).
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compelling parental testimony might encourage perjury or cause par-
ents to refuse to testify, resulting in contempt citations.62 They have
also addressed claims that parental testimony would violate certain
religious beliefs and the constitutional right to family privacy.63 None-
theless, most states and the federal courts have declined to create a
parent-child testimonial privilege.64
Traditionally, the commission of a crime by an individual has not
resulted in criminal punishment of his or her parents except in cir-
cumstances in which a statute has imposed a particular duty on a par-
ent with respect to the conduct of the child, or if the child performed
the criminal act under fear of, or compulsion by, his or her parent. 65
Although some states have recently enacted "parental responsibility"
laws in an attempt to criminally punish parents whose children com-
mit crimes, these attempts have been met with disapproval by courts
and commentators alike.66
62 Cf United States v. (Under Seal) In reAntitrust GrandJury Investigation, 714 F.2d
347, 351 (4th Cir.) (addressing defendant's claim that the prosecutor attempted to coerce
a guilty plea from a relative of a witness by threatening the witness with imprisonment for
contempt if he refused to testify after the witness expressed great reluctance to do so), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 978 (1983).
63 In Port v. Heard, 764 F.2d 423, 431-32 (5th Cir. 1985), the Fifth Circuit rejected the
claims of the defendant's father and step-mother that their religious views prohibited them
from testifying, and that compelling them to testify violated the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment. The Ports claimed that as Jews, they were prohibited by "Talmudic pro-
scription, applied in Rabbinical Courts, from... testifying against their... child." Id. at
431. In In reAgosto, 533 F. Supp. 1298 (D. Nev. 1983), the witness raised a similar claim,
asserting that his religious views prohibited him from testifying against his parents. The
witness cited "the Canons of the Roman Catholic Church, which prohibit a child's being
forced to testify against its parent in ecclesiastical tribunals" and the Biblical Command-
ment to "honor thy father and mother." Id. at 1300. See also In re Antitrust Grand Jury
Investigation, 714 F.2d at 347 (witness refused to testify against his family, claiming that it
would cause the family "immeasurable suffering" and "place him in an impossible conflict
with his religious and moral convictions").
64 See In re Starr, 647 F.2d 511, 512-13 (5th Cir. UnitA May 1981) (finding "no federal
judicial support for recognition of a 'parent-child' privilege, and declin[ing] to create
one") (footnote omitted); In re Terry W., 130 Cal. Rptr. 913 (Ct. App. 1976) (rejecting a
son's invocation of the parent-child privilege to preclude his mother's testimony against
him); People v. Sanders, 457 N.E.2d 1241, 1244-45 (Il1. 1983); Cissna v. State, 352 N.E.2d
793, 795 (Ind. 1976); Three Juveniles v. Commonwealth, 455 N.E.2d 1203, 1206 (Mass.
1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1068 (1984).
65 See Eunice A. Eichelberger, Annotation, Criminal Responsibility of Parent for Act of
Child, 12 A.L.R. 4TH 673, 676 (1982). The types of statutes that criminally punish parents
for their children's behavior include operation of motor vehicle statutes, contributing-to-
the-delinquency-of-minors statutes, curfew ordinances, and compulsory school attendance
laws. Id.
66 See, e.g., David Bernstein, Note, Parents' Criminal Liability for Acts of Minor Children:
Current Status of California Penal Code Section 272, 15J.Juv. L. 79 (1994); Penelope D. Clute,
Comment, "Parental Responsibility" Ordinances-Is Criminalizing Parents when Children Commit
UnlawfuIActs a Solution toJuvenile Delinqueny ?, 19 WAYNE L. REv. 1551 (1973); Note, Crimi-
nal Liability of Parents for Failure to Control their Children, 6 V~AL U. L. Rrv. 332 (1972); S.
Randall Humm, Comment, Criminalizing Poor Parenting Skills as a Means to Contain Vwlence
by and Against Children, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1123 (1991); Sharon A. IUgorsky, Note, Williams
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Moreover, this author could find only one case in which a court
granted a child the privilege not to testify against a parent.67 Because
children do not ordinarily serve as advisors to their parents, courts
have not extended the parent-child privilege to excuse children from
testifying when they have information that could incriminate their
parents. Unlike the marriage relationship, the parent-child relation-
ship is a blood relationship, thus courts do not fear that compelling
testimony of a child might cause the dissolution of the child's relation-
ship with his or her parent.68 The public interest in learning the truth
and in bringing the alleged wrong-doing parent to justice is believed
to outweigh whatever emotional or psychological harm a child might
suffer if required to speak out against his or her parent, as well as the
potentially harmful effects on the family as a whole.69
In sum, the American legal system provides a zone of privacy for
family life and respects the rights of individuals to make important
decisions regarding their personal affairs without government intru-
sion. Even at the prosecution phase of a criminal trial, family relation-
ships, especially the marital relationship, receive a shroud of
protection from the law. Only rarely have states attempted to punish
parents for the crimes of their children, and then without much
success.
II
FORFEITURE OF REAL PROPERTY THAT FACILITATES A
DRUG OFFENSE
Viewing the civil forfeiture system against the backdrop of the
constitutional ideals of family privacy and autonomy, one can better
v. Garcetti: Constitutional Defects in California's "Gang-Parent" Liability Statute, 28 Loy. LA L.
REv. 447 (1994); Kathryn J. Parsley, Note, Constitutional Limitations on State Power to Hold
Parents Criminally Liable for the Delinquent Acts of their Children, 44 VAND. L. REv. 441 (1991)
(discussing the constitutionality of "contributing to the delinquency of a minor laws");
Toni Weinstein, Note, Viiting the Sins of the Child on the Parent: The Legality of Criminal
Parental Liability Statutes, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 859 (1991).
67 In re Agosto, 553 F. Supp. at 1325.
68 See Port 764 F.2d at 431 ("[T]he parent-child relationship, based as it is on the
bonds of blood, [is] ... less susceptible of dissolution and therefore less in need ofjudicial
protection than the marital relationship.").
69 See, e.g., Doe v. United States, 842 F.2d 244, 247-28 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
894 (1988) (holding that the government's interest in investigating crimes outweighs a 15-
year-old's interests, including the observance of his religious beliefs, in not testifying
against his parents); United States v. Davies, 768 F.2d 893, 898 (7th Cir.) (rejecting parent-
child privilege to preclude minor child from testifying against his parents, focusing instead
on the need for truth), cert. denied; 474 U.S. 1008 (1985); United States v. Penn, 647 F.2d
876 (9th Cir.) (rejecting a general family privilege in a case involving evidence provided by
a son against his mother), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 903 (1980); DeLeon v. State, 684 S.W.2d
778, 782 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (rejecting parent-child privilege to preclude minor child
from testifying against his parents because it would not be "consistent with the ends of
justice").
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appreciate the novelty of the forfeiture doctrine as applied to
uninvolved family members of drug offenders. The following sections
examine the use of civil asset forfeiture in the fight against illegal
drugs and the emerging jurisprudence concerning the defense of in-
nocent ownership.
A. Asset Forfeiture as a Weapon to Combat Drugs
Civil forfeiture law as it exists today probably originated from Brit-
ish admiralty law.7 0 Since colonial times, federal law has provided for
the forfeiture of assets, such as ships and cargos involved in customs
offenses and piracy,7 ' and the use of forfeiture actions to enforce cus-
toms law continues to the present 7 2 Forfeiture provisions also appear
in over 100 statutes and are used to control a wide variety of activi-
ties.73 Yet forfeiture never received the widespread, systematic use
that now exists in law enforcement aimed at illegal drug traffic.
The advent of the "war on drugs" wrought fundamental changes
in law enforcement and has increased the scope and intensity of the
enforcement effort 7 4  Drug prosecutions dwarf all other cases
70 For a discussion of the history of civil forfeiture law in this country, see United
States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 507 U.S. 111, 118-23 (1993). In disputes between maritime
traders, the owners of seafaring vessels were likely to live abroad and thus outside the
jurisdiction of U.S. courts. The in rem civil action therefore provided a convenient way to
resolve maritime disputes. See Marc B. Stahl, Asset Forfeiture, Burdens of Proof and the War on
Drugs, 83J. CRim. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 274, 295 (1992); see also Austin v. United States, 113 S.
Ct. 2801, 2807-08 (1993) (stating that of the three types of forfeiture used in England, only
statutory forfeitures, such as those found in the navigation acts and those used to enforce
revenue or customs laws, took hold in this country). In fact, scholars have traced the prin-
ciple of forfeiting "guilty" property to punish a property owner for the misuse of his or her
property back to biblical times. For a thorough discussion of the history of forfeitures and
deodands, see Jacob J. Finkelstein, The Coring 0x Some Historical Perspectives on Deodand
Forfeitures, Wrongful Death and the Western Notion of Sovereignty, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 169 (1973).
71 See, e.g., United States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210 (1844) (forfeiture
of foreign-owned ship whose crew had engaged in piracy against American ship); The Pal-
myra Case, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827) (same).
72 See, e.g., 1991 ANN. REP. OF THE DEP'T OF JUSTICE ASSET FoRFLrURE PROGRAM 29
[hereinafter 1991 ANN. REP.] (noting that the Immigration and Naturalization Service for-
feits vehicles seized at the border because of their owners' immigration law violations).
73 Alok Ahuja, Comment, Civil Forfeiture, Warrantless Pmperty Seizures, and the Fourth
Amendment, 5 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 428, 430 (1987).
74 See generally Sandra Guerra, DomesticDruglnterdiction Operations: Finding The Balance,
82J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 1109, 1112-38 (1992) (addressing the transformation of po-
lice work and the use of novel drug search operations). The national drug control budget
has grown dramatically in the past few years. From 1981 to 1994, the budget for all federal
drug control measures grew 750% from 1.7 billion to 12.1 billion dollars. See OFFICE OF
NAT'L DRUG CONTROL PoL'Y, ExEcUTIVE OFF. OF THE PRES., NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL
STRATEGY, BUDGET SUMMARY 2 (1994). For 1995 and 1996, the budget is expected to grow
by approximately one billion dollars per year. See OFFIE OF NAT'L DRUG CONTROL POL'Y,
EXECUTIVE OFF. OF THE PRES., NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY, BUDGET SUMMARY 23
(1995).
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brought in federal courts. 75 And the emergence of civil asset forfei-
ture has, perhaps more than anything else, dramatically altered the
law enforcement landscape in this country.76 According to the
Supreme Court, drug forfeiture laws represent an "important expan-
sion of governmental power."77 Moreover, in the last seventeen years,
Congress has made numerous changes in the reach of civil drug asset
forfeiture law, dramatically increasing its scope.78 Through forfeiture
actions, the government can seize any type of property even minimally
connected to drug activity79 and convert it to law enforcement uses.80
The lure of collecting asset forfeiture proceeds has driven the devel-
opment of a vast, multijurisdictional drug law enforcement system.8'
75 In 1994, 41.8% of all offenders sentenced under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
for offenses committed after November 1, 1987 were convicted of drug offenses. U.S. SEN-
TENCING COMM'N, ANN. REP., at 39, tbl. 12 (1994). The next most commonly sentenced
offense was fraud, which represented 14.3% of all cases. Id. According to Bureau ofJus-
tice Statistics, "[the number of convicted drug offenders increased ninefold (from 19,000
to 172,300) from 1980 through 1992." BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTIcS, U.S. DEP'T OFJUS-
TICE CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, EXECUTIVE SuMMARY 2 (Apr.
1995).
76 For a discussion of civil drug asset forfeiture laws, see Sandra Guerra, Reconciling
Federal Asset Fofeitures and Drug Offense Sentencing, 78 MINN. L. REv. 805, 811-39 (1994) (de-
tailing the emergence and reformation of civil drug asset forfeiture laws).
77 United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 507 U.S. 111, 121 (1993).
78 Prior to 1978, the only items that could be seized were "illegal substances them-
selves and the instruments by which they were manufactured and distributed," including
conveyances. Id. In 1978, Congress enacted a forfeiture provision for drug proceeds. Id.;
see 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1994). The federal asset forfeiture program focuses on drug offenses,
but it also includes racketeering activity. In addition to the drug asset forfeiture statutes,
the government relies on the following statutes to confiscate property: Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970 § 803(a), 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1994) (civil forfeiture for gambling viola-
tions); Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, § 901(a), 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1994) (criminal
forfeiture for RICO violations); Money & Finance Act, § 5317, 31 U.S.C. § 5317 (1988 and
Supp. V 1993) (civil forfeiture for money laundering violations); Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1986, § 1366(a), 18 U.S.C. § 981 (1994) (civil forfeiture for money laundering violations
and felony drug violations against foreign nations); see also 1991 ANN. REP., supra, at 107
app. I. For a thorough discussion of the range of government imposed punitive civil sanc-
tions, see Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal and
Civil Law, 101 YALE LJ. 1795 (1992).
79 See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
80 The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 established the Department ofJus-
tice Assets Forfeiture Fund to collect the proceeds of forfeited assets, Pub. L. No. 98-473,
§ 310, 98 Stat. 1837, 2052 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 524(c)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
Congress amended 21 U.S.C. § 881(e) (1) (A) to provide for this transferred property to go
directly to law enforcement, rather than to the general fund of the United States Treasury
as previous forfeiture statutes required. Section 881(e) (1) (A) reads: "Whenever property
is civilly or criminally forfeited under this subchapter the Attorney General may-(A) re-
tain the property for official use or... transfer the property to any Federal agency or to
any State or local law enforcement agency which participated directly in the seizure or
forfeiture of the property...." 21 U.S.C. § 881 (e) (1) (A) (1994). The ability to seize drug-
related properties has emerged as a huge boon for law enforcement. Guerra, supra note
76, at 824-27.
81 Sandra Guerra, The Myth of Dual Sovereignty: Multiurisdictional Drug Law Enforcement
andDoubleJeopardy, 73 N.C. L. REv. 1159, 1182-85, 1187-88 (1995) (discussing the "federali-
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The most significant expansion in civil forfeiture law occurred in
1984 when Congress added a provision making forfeitable "[a]ll real
property... in the whole or any lot or tract of land... which is used,
or intended to be used... to commit, or to facilitate the commission
of, a [controlled substance] violation." 82 If a child sells drugs in his or
her parents' home (and the property thus "facilitates" the offense),
not only is the child criminally liable, but his or her parents risk forfei-
ture of their property. A drug offense committed anywhere inside the
property line renders the entire lot and dwelling place subject to for-
feiture.83 Similarly, drug proceeds and property purchased with
them, as well as "conveyances" such as automobiles, boats, and planes
are forfeitable. 84
zation" of law enforcement such that state and local agents work under the control of
federal law enforcement officials as joint drug task forces).
82 Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention & Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 98-473,
§ 306, 98 Stat. 1837, 2050 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1994)).
83 In Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2811-12 (1993), the Supreme Court held
that, if the civil forfeitures are punitive in nature, the Eighth Amendment's proscription
against excessive fines requires trial courts to limit the value of the assets forfeited accord-
ing to the severity of the crime. The Austin Court distinguished the remedial forfeiture of
"instrumentalities" of crime and "contraband" from the punitive forfeiture of real property
and conveyances, which the Court viewed "as payment to a sovereign as punishment for
some offense." Id. at 2812 (citing Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S.
257, 265 (1989)); see also Guerra, supra note 76, at 833-39 (discussing Austin).
The circuit courts have applied different tests for excessiveness. The Fourth Circuit
examines how extensively the property was involved in the drug offense. This has been
referred to as an "instrumentality" test. See United States v. Chandler, 36 F.3d 358, 364
(4th Cir. 1994) (holding that the constitutional limitation applies to the degree of taint,
not to the value of the involved property or the gravity of the offense), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 1792 (1995). The Eighth and Ninth Circuits consider the "egregiousness of the crime
[in relation] to the amount of the forfeiture" and take into account the "in personam
punishment of the owner, the hardship to the defendant and the defendant's family, and
the culpability of the owner in relation to the crime." See United States v. $69,292, 62 F.3d
1161, 1166 (9th Cir. 1995); see also United States v. 9638 Chicago Heights, 27 F.3d 327,330-
31 (8th Cir. 1994) (applying a similar standard). The Second Circuit takes into account
both the degree to which the property was an instrumentality in the offense and other
factors related to proportionality. See United States v. Milbrand, 58 F.3d 841, 846 (2d Cir.
1995); see also United States v. 1215 Kelly Rd., 860 F. Supp. 764, 756-66 (W.D. Wash. 1994)
(adopting a multi-factor test for excessive fines analysis); see generally, Michael J. Munn,
Note, The Aftermath ofAustin v. United States: When is Civil Forfeiture an Excessive Fine?, 1994
UTAH L. REV. 1255; Douglas S. Reinhart, Note, Applying the Eighth Amendment To CivilForfei-
ture After Austin v. United States: Excessiveness and Praortionality, 36 WM. & MARY L. Rxv.
235 (1994).
84 In 1970, Congress provided for the forfeiture of contraband and containers and
conveyances used to transport contraband. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention &
Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 511, 84 Stat. 1236, 1276 (codified as amended at
21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (1994)). The reach of the law was extended in 1978 by authorizing the
forfeiture of"[a]ll moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of value fur-
nished.., in exchange for a controlled substance.., or intended to be used to facilitate
any violation .... " Psychotropic Substances Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-633, § 301(a) (2),
92 Stat. 3768, 3777 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (6) (1994)).
362 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81:343
Prosecutors prefer to invoke the civil asset forfeiture law, rather
than its criminal counterpart, because the civil process offers the gov-
ernment many important advantages.85 As previously mentioned, civil
forfeiture law allows the government to seize the property of persons
who have not themselves violated the law.8 6 A civil forfeiture action is
brought against the property, not the offender, based on the fiction
that the property is itself "guilty" and therefore the owner has no in-
terest in its disposition.8 7 Forfeiture actions are thus styled as the gov-
ernment versus the property, identified by its address or other
description. The law allows the government to take the "guilty" prop-
erty because it has been misused, regardless of who misused it. Thus,
civil forfeiture laws permit the government to take property prior to
obtaining a conviction, and indeed, without ever bringing criminal
charges at all.88
85 The anti-drug laws provide for criminal forfeiture. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 853 (1994).
The procedures for seizures under the criminal forfeiture law are more cumbersome for
prosecutors and thus, are used less often. See Guerra, supra note 76, at 822 nn.61-62 (dis-
cussing criminal forfeiture procedure). Although the criminal forfeiture process gives
greater protection to the constitutional rights of criminal defendants who own property, it
nonetheless creates grave problems for the property interests of innocent third parties. See
Michael Goldsmith & MarkJ. Linderman, Asset Forfeure and Third Party Rights: The Need for
Further Law Reform, 1989 DuKE L.J. 1254, 1263-64 [hereinafter Goldsmith & Linderman]
(discussing the government's use of restraining orders to prevent the transfer of property,
placing the interests of third parties in limbo until after conviction and sentencing).
86 The criminal forfeiture law, by contrast, provides for the forfeiture of an offender's
property after conviction as part of the sentence imposed. The federal criminal forfeiture
statute provides, in relevant part:
Any person convicted of a violation ... punishable by imprisonment for
more than one year shall forfeit to the United States, irrespective of any
provision of State law-
(1) any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds the per-
son obtained, directly or indirectly, as the result of such violation;
(2) any of the person's property used, or intended to be used, in any
manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, such
violation; and
(3) in the case of a person convicted of engaging in a continuing crim-
inal enterprise in violation of section 848 of this title, the person shall
forfeit... any of his interest in, claims against, and property or con-
tractual rights affording a source of control over, the continuing crimi-
nal enterprise.
21 U.S.C. § 853(a) (1994).
87 The Supreme Court first enunciated the guilty property theory of civil asset forfei-
ture in United States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 233 (1844). The Court
stated that "[t]he vessel which commits the aggression is treated as the offender, as the
guilty instrument or thing to which the forfeiture attaches, without any reference whatso-
ever to the character or conduct of the owner." Id. This legal fiction persists in civil forfei-
ture law to date. See Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994, 998 (1996) (quoting The Palmyra,
25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827)); Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663,
680-84 (1974); see also 1991 ANN. REP., supra note 72, at 7-8; Terrance G. Reed, American
Forfeiture Law: Propey Oumers Meet the Prosecutor, CATO INST. POL'Y ANALYSIS, Sept. 29,
1992, at 3, 6-7 (discussing the fiction of proceeding against the property).
88 See Guerra, supra note 76, at 821-22. Traditionally, civil forfeitures were not consid-
ered criminal "punishment," but rather a civil "penalty." The Supreme Court's decision in
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By virtue of the fact that the forfeiture action is considered a civil
lawsuit, the government can avoid providing property owners with
many of the protections the Constitution affords criminal defend-
ants.8 9 Of greatest consequence to property owners is the lower stan-
dard of proof-in this case, probable cause 9 0-that the government
must satisfy to seize property.91
The very factors that make civil forfeiture attractive to prosecu-
tors make it devastating to property owners. The broad powers given
to prosecutors authorize them to take action to seize a family's home
based on the wrongdoing of any member of the household or a
guest.92 The family must defend against the forfeiture to keep its
Austin departs from tradition in finding that federal drug-related forfeitures of real prop-
erty and conveyances are punitive and hence subject to the Excessive Fines Clause of the
Eighth Amendment. See supra note 83; cf. also Dep't of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth
Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1948 (1994) (holding that state tax assessment on illegal drugs
constitutes "punishment" for purpose of double jeopardy analysis).
89 Numerous commentators have criticized the paucity of protection for the constitu-
tional rights of property owners under the civil forfeiture scheme. See generally Goldsmith
& Linderman, supra note 85 (assessing the due process rights of third parties); William P.
Nelson, Should the Ranch Go Free Because the Constable Blundered? Gaining Compliance with
Search and Seizure Standards in the Age of Asset Forfeiture; 80 CAL. L. Ra,. 1309 (1992) (sug-
gesting incorporation of Fourth Amendment protections in forfeiture cases); Craig W.
Palm, RICO Forfeiture and the Eighth Amendment: When is Everything Too Much?, 53 U. Prrr. L.
Rrv. 1 (1991) (discussing Eighth Amendment concerns in RICO forfeiture cases); Stahl,
supra note 70 (arguing that the allocation of the burden of proof in civil forfeiture cases
violates the Due Process Clause); Ahuja, Comment, supra note 73 (advocating strict appli-
cation of Fourth Amendment standards in civil forfeiture cases); Tamara R. Piety, Com-
ment, Scorched Earth: How the Expansion of Civil Forfeiture Doctrine Has Laid Waste to Due
Process, 45 U. MIAMi L. Ray. 911 (1991) (endorsing the proposition that "draconian" civil
forfeiture laws violate defendants' due process rights); Damon G. Saltzburg, Note, Real
Property Forfeiture as a Weapon in the Government's War on Drugs: A Failure to Protect Innocent
Ownership Rights, 72 B.U. L Ray. 217 (1992) (discussing the need to balance the govern-
ment's interests against the due process rights of innocent owners); Michael Schecter,
Note, Fear andLoathing and the Forfeiture Laws, 75 CORNELL L REy. 1151 (1990) (proposing
reform of forfeiture laws to adequately safeguard due process rights);James B. Speta, Note,
Narrowing the Scope of Civil Drug Forfeiture: Section 881, Substantial Connection and the Eighth
Amendment, 89 MICH. L. REv. 165 (1990) (finding a constitutional need to narrow the scope
of drug forfeitures).
90 See infra note 125 and accompanying text.
91 As in any criminal case, the government would have to prove the property owner's
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to obtain a conviction. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,
364 (1970) (holding that "the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction
except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the
crime charged").
92 For real property seizures, the Supreme Court has determined that due process
requires pre-seizure notice to the owner and the right to a hearing. United States v.James
Daniel Good Property, 114 S. Ct. 492, 505 (1993). The government can, however, file a lis
pendens on the property which makes it non-transferable during the pendency of the forfei-
ture litigation. See, e.g., United States v. 4492 S. Livonia Rd., 889 F.2d 1258, 1265 (2d Cir.
1989).
The government can obtain summary judgment granting a warrant to seize the prop-
erty unless the claimant can produce evidence to raise a "genuine issue as to any material
fact." United States v. Lot 4, Block 5 of Eaton Acres, 904 F.2d 487, 490 (9th Cir. 1990).
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home.93 To do so, the family will need adequate legal representation.
But, because forfeiture actions are civil actions, the property owners
are not constitutionally entitled to appointed counsel, as are indigent
criminal defendants. 94 Moreover, lawyers may not accept civil asset
forfeiture cases on a contingent fee basis because winning the lawsuit
results only in retaining the property and not in a monetary award.9 5
Property owners faced with forfeiture will have no choice but to hire
an attorney, and to pay fees and litigation costs outright to present
their defense of innocence.
B. The "Innocent Owner" Defenses
Throughout most of the long history of civil asset forfeiture, the
pleas of innocent property owners whose property had been used un-
lawfully fell on deaf ears in the courts.96 Courts adhered religiously to
The claimant must "produce evidence on which a reasonable trier of fact could find in its
favor, viewing the record as a whole in light of the evidentiary burden the law places on
that party." Id. (citation omitted). In forfeiture cases, the property owner may offer evi-
dence on two issues to defeat a summary judgment motion: (1) that the property was not
used to facilitate a drug violation or (2) that the owner was innocent. If the evidence
offered consists only of the owner's "self-serving declarations," these must be "detailed"
and not merely "conclusory allegations." Id. at 490 n.3. A ruling that the owner's testi-
mony consists of only "self-serving" and "conclusory allegations" would be insufficient to
defeat the summaryjudgment motion and would result in the expeditious and final seizure
of the property. Id.
93 Mortagees and lienholders, on the other hand, can have their interests in the prop-
erty settled and paid by the government through an expedited process. See generally ExEcu-
TIVE OFF. FOR ASSET FoRFrrruRE, OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATr'Y GEN., EXPEDITED FORFEITURE
SETTLEMENT POLICY FOR MORTGAGEES AND LIENHOLDERS (1993).
Sometimes family members' cases can be settled out of court as well. See, e.g., United
States v. 163 Renwick St., 859 F. Supp. 93, 94 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (government agreed to
settlement of innocent wife's interest in family home). In joint tenancies, however, the
innocent spouse may nonetheless be required to vacate the premises and receive only his
or her share of the proceeds from the sale of the home. See infra notes 178-85 and accom-
panying text.
94 See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 36 (1972) (holding that the Sixth Amend-
ment requires appointed counsel for defendants charged with petty offenses punishable by
incarceration); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 358 (1963) (holding that the Equal
Protection Clause requires appointed appellate counsel for the first appeal); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963) (holding that the Sixth Amendment grants an indi-
gent the right to appointed counsel in all felony cases).
95 In United States v. A Single Story Double Wide Trailer, 727 F. Supp. 149 (D. Del.
1989), a Delaware district court considered and rejected a trailer home owner's claim that
his inability to find an attorney should be grounds for setting aside a default judgment.
The court stated that this claim was "not easily verifiable by the court." Id. at 153. It did,
however, agree that "[ e] xtreme difficulty in obtaining representation is a mitigating factor
in the analysis." Id. at 152-53 (citation omitted). But in regards to this particular owner,
the court found that his "repeated efforts to find an attorney," without more, constituted
culpable negligence because he had not attempted to enter a pro se appearance or to ex-
plain his difficulty to opposing counsel or to the court. Id. at 153.
96 Early cases upheld the forfeiture of properties and conveyances notwithstanding
the innocence of the owners. See, e.g., J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254
U.S. 505 (1921); Dobbins's Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395 (1877).
[Vol. 81:343
FAMILY VALUES?
the fiction that guilt attached to the property itself and that therefore,
the possible innocence of the owner was irrelevant. 7
Dicta in the Supreme Court's decision in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson
Yacht Leasing Co. opened the door slightly for innocent property own-
ers to raise a defense based on the Fifth Amendment's takings
clause.98 A decade later, in 1984, Congress began amending the civil
drug forfeiture laws to include a defense for innocent owners.99 The
following sections discuss these constitutional and statutory defenses
and assess the jurisprudence these defenses spawned.
1. The Constitutional Defense
Ironically, the Supreme Court first acknowledged the possibility
that civil forfeiture might infringe upon an owner's constitutional
rights in a decision rejecting the claim of an owner who neither com-
mitted a crime nor had any knowledge of wrongdoing on the prop-
erty. The claimant in Calera-Toledo had leased a yacht to two Puerto
Rican residents who had brought a marijuana cigarette on board.'00
The yacht leasing company argued that the forfeiture amounted to a
government taking without just compensation because the company
was an innocent owner.1 1 The Court held that the Constitution did
not forbid Congress from authorizing the forfeiture of illegally-used
property even if the owner had no involvement with or knowledge of
the offense.1 02
While rejecting the claim of an owner who had no prior knowl-
edge that its property would be wrongfully used, the Court carved out
a narrow exception for owners who could demonstrate a greater de-
gree of innocence. 10 3 The Court distinguished the situation in Calero-
Toledo, in which the owners exercised judgment and control in leasing
the yacht, from one in which the property owners exercised no con-
trol in entrusting the property to others. 10 4 The Court identified two
types of truly innocent owners: those whose property had been taken
97 See, e.g., J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co., 254 U.S. at 511 (the view of property as of-
fender "is too firmly fixed in the punitive and remedial jurisprudence of the country to be
now displaced"); Dobbinss Distillry, 96 U.S. at 400 ("[tlhe thing.., is primarily considered
as the offender"); United States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 233 (1844)
( 'he vessel which commits the aggression is treated as the offender, as the guilty instru-
ment or thing to which the forfeiture attaches, without any reference whatsoever to the
character or conduct of the owner.").
98 416 U.S. 663, 689-90 (1974). The Fifth Amendment forbids "private property [to]
be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
99 See infra notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
100 Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 665 (1974); id. at 693
(Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
101 Id. at 680.
102 Id. at 688.
103 Id. at 689.
104 Id. at 690.
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"without... privity or consent,"10 5 and those who "had done all that
reasonably could be expected to prevent the proscribed use."106 In
either case, the Court reasoned, "it would be difficult to conclude that
forfeiture served legitimate purposes, and was not unduly oppres-
sive." 10 7 The Court observed that forfeiture of property involving a
truly innocent owner would "give rise to serious constitutional
questions." 0 8
In a case that involved the very intra-family issues addressed by
this Article, the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the doctrine of
Calero-Toledo, but implicitly called into question the viability of the
constitutional claim of owners who "[have] done all that reasonably
could be expected to prevent the proscribed use."10 9 The Court's 5-4
decision in Bennis v. Michigan upholds the forfeiture of a car owned
jointly by a married couple and seized by the state upon a finding that
the husband had used it for purposes of engaging in illegal sexual
activity with a prostitute. 110 The wife claimed that her lack of knowl-
edge or consent of the illegal use to which her husband put the vehi-
cle rendered her "innocent," and therefore the forfeiture violated her
rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
and the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment."'
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnqulst relied on the
"long and unbroken line of cases [that hold] that an owner's interest
in property may be forfeited by reason of the use to which the prop-
105 Id. at 689.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 689-90.
108 Id. at 689; see also Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2809-10 (1993) (relying
on the notion that an owner was negligent in allowing his property to be misused).
109 Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994, 999 (1996).
110 Id. at 1001. The state obtained an "order of abatement" under Michigan law which
characterized such misused property as a nuisance. Id. at 996 n.3. A dissenting opinion
authored by Justice Stevens and in which Justices Souter and Breyerjoined points out the
novelty of Mrs. Bennis's plight: "[I~t was not until 1988 that any state decided to experi-
ment.., by confiscating property in which, or on which, a single transaction with a prosti-
tute has been consummated." Id. at 1003 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
111 Id. at 998. In a concurring opinion, Justice Thomas expressed the view that
although "the Federal Constitution does not prohibit everything that is intensely undesir-
able," the property that can be made subject to forfeiture for misuse should be strictly
limited to "instrumentalities." Id. at 1002 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Justice Ginsburg also concurred in a separate opinion, stating that at most Mrs. Bennis
was entitled to a portion of the proceeds of the sale of the car, but the trial court in an
"equitable action" had declined to award her the proceeds for the "practical reasons" that
the Bennises owned another car and the forfeited car was of so little value that there would
be "practically nothing" to divide. Id. at 1003 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Justice Gins-
burg's concurring opinion may indicate that she agreed with the disposition of this case
based on its unique facts and the unique law being applied, but that under other circum-
stances she would find a due process violation in the forfeiture of property from an owner
who lacks knowledge of wrongdoing. In that event, the Court would lack a majority for the
contrary proposition.
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erty is put even though the owner did not know that it was put to such
use."112 The Court dispensed with the Takings Clause claim by hold-
ing that the State had lawfully taken the property by governmental
authority other than the power of eminent domain, and thus, was not
required to compensate the owner.113
Of particular interest, the decision implies that an owner would
likely have a valid due process defense against forfeiture of "property
[that] is stolen.., or otherwise taken from him without his privity or
consent" and illegally used by a criminal. 114 However, the due process
claim of an owner who "had done all that reasonably could be ex-
pected to prevent the proscribed use of the property" is referred to as
mere "obiter dictum."115 This aspect of the wife's defense was re-
jected on the basis that she had not made any showing beyond her
lack of knowledge. 16
Because it is unlikely that a prosecutor would seek to confiscate
property that had been wrongfully taken from its owner and misused,
the only constitutional defense in the ordinary forfeiture case that
might be available to an owner is that he or she did all that reasonably
could be expected to prevent the misuse. Accordingly, although the
owners in Calero-Toledo and Bennis were "innocent" in the sense that
they had not demonstrated any affirmative conduct that would indi-
cate a culpable state of mind-they had no actual knowledge nor any
reason to believe that those using the property would violate the law
and they certainly had not procured or taken part in any illegality
themselves'17-they and owners like them could not prevail on a due
process claim. The possibility exists that similarly situated owners
112 Id. at 995.
113 Id. at 1001.
114 Id. at 999 n.5.
115 Id. at 999.
116 Id. The two dissenting opinions take the position that the forfeiture of property
from an owner who is "truly innocent" violates the Due Process Clause. The Stevens dis-
sent takes the position that case law supports the forfeiture of an innocent owner's prop-
erty only when the "principal use" of the property is to facilitate the commission of a crime.
Id. at 1005-07 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The opinion also apparently agrees with Justice
Thomas's concurring opinion that property should not be forfeitable unless it is an instru-
mentality. Id. at 1002 (StevensJ, dissenting). In this case, the Bennis car "bore no neces-
sary connection to the offense committed by petitioner's husband" in the sense that the
crime "might just as well have occurred in a multitude of other locations." Id. at 1006
(Stevens, J., dissenting). The forfeiture of the vehicle serves no remedial purpose, the
dissent argues, but is entirely punitive. Id. at 1009 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Thus, punish-
ment of Mrs. Bennis, who is "entirely without responsibility" and "in no way negligent in
her use or entrustment of the fanily car," is fundamentally unfair. Id. at 1007 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Justice Kennedy, writing a separate dissenting opinion, agreed that the forfei-
ture violates due process because there was no showing of "negligent entrustment or crimi-
nal complicity" on her "part. Id. at 1011 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
117 Indeed, the dissent notes that Mrs. Bennis might be considered a victim of her
husband's unlawful activity. Id. at 1009 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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could prevail if they could show that they had taken affirmative steps
on their own initiative to prevent the illegal use of the property, but
Bennis does not bode well for the viability of even this narrow claim.
2. The Statutory "Innocent Owner" Defense
At the same time Congress expanded the reach of forfeiture law
to real property, it also provided a statutory defense for owners having
no involvement with drug violations occurring on their property. The
statutory defense excepts "innocent owners" from the forfeiture law.
It states: "[N]o property shall be forfeited under this paragraph, to
the extent of the interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission
established by that owner to have been committed or omitted without
the knowledge or consent of that owner."" 8 An identical exception
applies to the forfeiture of drug proceeds," 9 and a similar exception
applies to conveyances except that it does not cover owners who act
with "willful blindness."' 20 Because the three provisions read almost
identically, the courts have viewed themselves as bound by precedent
to apply the reasoning of forfeiture cases involving one type of asset,
such as real property, in forfeiture cases involving other types of assets,
such as conveyances and drug proceeds. 121
A review of the "innocent owner" defense jurisprudence reveals a
theoretical morass attributable to the procedural oddity of the civil in
rem forfeiture action, the poor drafting of the forfeiture provisions,
and the inherently slippery mens rea terms used to define innocent
property owners. These factors have made the task of applying the
forfeiture provisions extremely difficult. To further complicate the
situation, the courts do not have any helpful legislative history to
guide them.122
118 Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention & Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 98-473,
§ 306, 98 Stat. 1837, 2050 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1994)).
119 Psychotropic Substances Act of 1978, § 301(a), 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1994).
120 The "innocent owner" exception for conveyances reads: "[N]o conveyance shall be
forfeited under this paragraph to the extent of an interest of an owner, by reason of any act
or omission established by that owner to have been committed or omitted without the
knowledge, consent, or willful blindness of the owner." Comprehensive Drug Abuse Pre-
vention & Control Act of 1970 § 511(a) (4)(B), 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4)(C) (1994).
121 See, e.g., United States v. One 1973 Rolls Royce, 43 F.3d 794, 799-801 (3d Cir. 1994)
(finding the reasoning in a real property case to be binding in a conveyance case) (citing
United States v. 6109 Grubb Rd., 886 F.2d 618 (3d Cir. 1989)).
122 See, e.g., One 1973 Roll Royce, 43 F.3d at 815 & n.20 (describing legislative history for
forfeitures of real property and conveyances as "unhelpful"); Loomba, supra note 3, at 484
(stating that legislative history for forfeitures "provides no direct basis" for answering the




a. The Procedural Oddity of Civil Asset Forfeiture
The civil in rem asset forfeiture action differs procedurally from
both the criminal action and the typical civil action. Ordinarily, the
party "who generally seeks to change the present state of affairs...
naturally should be expected to bear the risk of failure of proof or
persuasion." 23 In the "general run of issues in civil cases," the plain-
tiff must produce evidence to prove its case "by a preponderance of
the evidence." 2 4 In civil forfeiture actions, however, the government,
which "seeks to change the present state of affairs," need only estab-
lish probable cause 12 5 to believe that the property is subject to forfei-
ture, i.e., that someone has illegally used the property, be it the owner
or another. The government may show probable cause by introduc-
ing otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence. 12 6 The government is
not required to prove the owner's guilt.
123 EDWIN W. CL.ARY ET AL., McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE § 337, at 949 (3d ed. 1984). In a
typical civil negligence case, the plaintiff bears the burdens of pleading, production, and
persuasion. Id. at 948. In criminal cases, of course, the government bears the burden of
proving the elements of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. See supra note 91.
124 CLEARY ET Al., supra note 123, § 339, at 956.
125 "'Probable cause' refers to 'reasonable ground for belief of guilt, supported by less
than prima facie proof but more than mere suspicion.'" United States v. $4,255,000, 762
F.2d 895, 903 (1lth Cir. 1985), cet. denied, 474 U.S. 1056 (1986) (citations omitted); accord
15603 85th Ave. North, 933 F.2d 976, 979 (1lth Cir. 1991). For a thorough discussion of
burden of proof issues in civil drug asset forfeitures, see Stahl, supra note 70, at 284-86, 291-
93.
Some courts also have spoken of probable cause in asset forfeiture cases as requiring
proof of "reasonable grounds to believe that a substantial connection exists between the
property to be forfeited and the criminal activity...." United States v. 8848 S. Commercial
St., 757 F. Supp. 871, 879 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (emphasis added). This requirement apparently
derives from the legislative history of the innocent owner provision for drug proceeds,
which states that "it is the intent of these provisions that the property would be forfeited
only if there is a substantial connection between the property and the underlying criminal
activity." Joint Explanatory Statement of Titles II and III, 124 CONG. RIC. S17,647 (1978),
reprinted at 1978 U.S.CAN. 9518, 9522 (1979); see also 6109 Grubb Rd., 886 F.2d at 625
(quoting related legislative history).
Other courts have rejected the "substantial connection" test, requiring "'only a nexus
between'" the property and the offense. United States v. 163 Renwick St., 859 F. Supp. 93,
96 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (citing United States v. Daccarett, 6 F.3d 37, 55-56 (2d Cir. 1993), cert.
denied 114 S. Ct. 1294 (1994)); see also $4,255,000, 762 F.2d at 902-03 (explicitly rejecting
the substantial connection test).
126 The rules of evidence, including, most significantly, the hearsay rules, do not apply
during probable cause hearings. See, e.g., United States v. Lots 12, 13, 14 & 15, Keeton
Heights, 869 F.2d 942, 948 n.1 (6th Cir. 1989) (citing United States v. One 1964 Beechcraft
Baron Aircraft, 691 F.2d 725 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom., Presto v. United States,
461 U.S. 914 (1983)). Hearsay is a form of evidence generally excluded because of its
perceived untrustworthiness. See FED. R. EVID. 802 (hearsay generally inadmissible).
The permissibility of considering hearsay at the probable cause stage of the process
creates a dilemma in ajury trial, in which the duty to assess the innocent ownership de-
fense, a question of fact, rests with thejury. United States v. 1012 Germantown Rd., 963
F.2d 1496, 1501 (11th Cir. 1992). Since a trial court may consider otherwise inadmissible
hearsay evidence in a probable cause hearing, the question has arisen whether juries
should be allowed to hear the inadmissible evidence that is presented to the court or
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The property owners must introduce the issue of their innocence
as an affirmative defense and then prove their innocence by a prepon-
derance of the evidence. 127 The owners face the unenviable task of
proving a negative: that they did not have knowledge of or did not
consent to the illegal use. 128 An owner may have no better evidence
available to prove that he or she did not know or consent to a drug
offense than the otherwise unverifiable testimony, "I did not know or
consent."' 29 If the owner raises an "innocent owner" defense, the gov-
ernment then has the opportunity to disprove that claim.
b. Poor Draftsmanship
The Third Circuit has described the "innocent owner" defense as
"[f]illed with negatives, its language is nearly impenetrable."130 To
demonstrate the "linguistic" difficulty, the court removed two of the
negatives and the burden of proof language from the real property
forfeiture provision, resulting in the following construction: "property
shall be forfeited under [§ 881 (a) (7) ] to the extent of an interest of
an owner, by reason of any act or omission... committed or omitted
with[ ] the knowledge or consent of the owner."13 This revision,
although grammatically improving the language, distorts the meaning
of the provision. The negatives and burden of proof language, even
with the "linguistic difficulty" they produce, more accurately commu-
whether the two phases of the process should be bifurcated, such that the probable cause
hearing would be before the judge alone. Id. If the process is bifurcated, the jury would
not hear the government's evidence concerning the forfeitability of the property. If, on
the other hand, the process is not bifurcated, the jury would hear evidence that would be
inadmissible at trial. In 1012 Germantown Rd., the trial court refused to bifurcate the trial,
stating, "otherwise, the case [would not] make any sense at all to let the defendant go
forward with proof, and disprove something not at issue." Id. at 1499 (citation omitted)
(alteration in original). Indeed, the trial court allowed the jury to consider the inadmissi-
ble hearsay testimony as "background" and "contextual" evidence in evaluating the inno-
cent ownership defense. Id. at 1502. The Eleventh Circuit reversed this decision, holding
that forfeiture cases tried before a jury must be bifurcated if the government plans to
introduce inadmissible evidence during the probable cause phase. Id. at 1501.
The practice of using inadmissible hearsay usually presents no difficulty since "forfei-
ture cases are typically tried as bench trials, making it relatively easy for the judge as
factfinder to sort out the hearsay evidence from the admissible evidence." Id. And even if
tried before a judge, "the improper use of hearsay evidence during the innocent owner
portion of the trial is grounds for remand." Id. at 1501-02.
127 See, e.g., United States v. One 1989Jeep Wagoneer, 976 F.2d 1172, 1174 (8th Cir.
1992); 1012 Germantown Rd., 963 F.2d at 1501; United States v. $215,300, 882 F.2d 417, 419
(9th Cir. 1989).
128 The common law generally did not require anyone to prove a negative. SeeAndrew
Crispo Gallery v. Comm'r, 16 F.3d 1336, 1342 (2d Cir. 1994)); 163 Renwick St., 859 F. Supp.
at 96 (citing Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 218 (1960)).
129 See, e.g., 8848 S. Commercial St., 757 F. Supp. at 876 (rejecting the government's
argument that claimants' "simple denials" were insufficient and that claimants should af-
firmatively demonstrate their lack of knowledge to defeat a summary judgment motion).




nicate the challenge the innocent owner defense poses to property
owners. The Third Circuit's revision suggests that the government
may not forfeit someone's property unless it can first show that the
owner had knowledge of or had consented to the offense. However,
this is not the case. The statute puts the onus on the owner to prove
the negative, i.e., to prove his or her lack of knowledge or consent:
"[N]o property shall be forfeited under this paragraph, to the extent
of the interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission established
by that owner to have been committed or omitted without the knowledge
or consent of that owner. s13 2
Of critical importance is the language in the statute that speaks of
an act "committed .. .without the knowledge or consent of the
owner." Courts have struggled to interpret this phrase. What did
Congress mean by "knowledge or consent"? Knowledge is generally
understood to require some conscious awareness of the facts at is-
sue.'33 If consent is defined as "compliance or approval,"13 4 then
"[i]n order to comply or approve of something [done by another], it
is only common sense that one must have knowledge of it."135 In
other words, one can have knowledge without giving consent, but one
cannot consent without having knowledge. Proof of consent necessar-
ily requires proof of knowledge. Most courts therefore interpret the
statute to mean that in raising the innocent owner defense, an owner
can establish his or her innocence by showing either a lack of knowl-
edge or a lack of consent.136
132 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (7) (1994) (emphasis added).
133 The Model Penal Code defines "knowingly" as regards knowledge of circumstances
as follows: "A person acts knowingly... when.., he is aware ... that such circumstances
exist." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
134 United States v. 141st St. Corp., 911 F.2d 870, 878 (2d Cir. 1990) (citing WEBSTER'S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcrIONARY 482 (1971)), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1109 (1991).
135 Id.
136 United States v. 1012 Germantown Rd., 963 F.2d 1496, 1503 (11th Cir. 1992); 141st
St. Corp., 911 F.2d at 877-78; United States v. 6109 Grubb Rd., 886 F.2d 618, 626 (3d Cir.),
rehg deni d 890 F.2d 659 (3d Cir. 1989).
The Ninth Circuit, however, has put forth the odd requirement that an owner must
prove both lack of knowledge and lack of consent in order to prevail. United States v. Lot
111-B, 902 F.2d 1443, 1445 (9th Cir. 1990) (per curiam). Such a requirement nullifies the
lack of consent defense. If an owner did not have knowledge, then it follows that he or she
did not consent; the lack-of-consent defense adds nothing. On the other hand, if the
owner had knowledge, but did not consent, the owner nevertheless loses because the court
requires that the owner prove both lack of knowledge and lack of consent. Because one
cannot withhold consent unless one has knowledge, the lack-of-consent defense again adds
nothing. See 141st St. Corp., 911 F.2d at 878.
A district court in Hawaii, however, explains the Ninth Circuit's decision in Lot 111-B
more sensibly. The court found it to require that the government prove both knowledge
and consent to defeat an innocent owner claim-not that the claimant prove both lack of
knowledge and lack of consent. Evidence of mere knowledge would thus be sufficient to
defeat innocent owner defense, but only "if the claimant does not do all that reasonably
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When an owner establishes his or her innocence by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, the government must then refute this claim in
order to prevail. It is at this point that the use of the disjunctive "or"
between "knowledge" and "consent" has presented some difficulty for
the courts. 137 The government clearly wins if it can show that the
owner consented to (and thus implicitly had knowledge of) the drug
offense. Can the government prevail, however, if it can establish only
that the owner had knowledge, but did not consent? If knowledge
alone is sufficient, then the question of consent becomes irrelevant,
and courts usually avoid any reading of a statute that renders part of it
irrelevant.1 38 Nonetheless, the fact that the only sensible reading of
the provision would provide a defense for owners who can prove either
lack of knowledge or lack of consent, but would allow the government
to prevail only if it can prove both knowledge and consent, has created
a fair bit of confusion. 139
c. Interpreting "Lack of Knowledge"
To establish a person's criminal liability, the law ordinarily re-
quires the party alleging a violation to establish that the other party
acted with a culpable state of mind or mens rea.14° The Model Penal
Code, for example, provides that "a person is not guilty of an offense
unless he acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently, as the
law may require, with respect to each material element of the of-
fense."1 41 Furthermore, the mental culpability must concur with the
physical act, "in the sense that the former actuates the latter." 42 The
forfeiture rules, however, operate differently. In forfeiture cases, the
law penalizes property owners for the criminal acts of others. Thus,
one person may commit an offense, and another person may be pe-
nalized for knowing about it and letting it happen. Should an owner
have a defense if he or she only learned of the offense committed by
could be expected to prevent the [offense]." United States v. Property Titled in the Names
of Ponce, 751 F. Supp. 1436, 1441 (D. Haw. 1990).
137 See United States v. 710 Main St., 744 F. Supp. 510, 522-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) and cases
cited therein.
138 141st St. Corp., 911 F.2d at 878 (citing United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-
39 (1955); United States v. Berrios, 869 F.2d 25, 28-29 (2d Cir. 1989)).
139 See supra note 136.
140 The mental element of criminal conduct has long been considered the bedrock
justification for criminal punishment. Mens rea plays a less significant role in civil law. For
a discussion of the comparative importance of mental culpability in criminal and civil law,
see Mann, supra note 78, at 1805-06.
141 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). The penal codes of
at least 37 states underwent fundamental change to incorporate the mens rea concepts of
the Model Penal Code. See PETER W. Low Er AL., CRIMINAL LAWr CASES AND MATERIALS
app. A, at A-3 (2d ed. 1986).
142 LAFAvE & Scorr, supra note 30, at 194.
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another on the owner's property after the fact, perhaps when police
searched the premises?
The relevant provision provides, in part: "[N]o property shall be
forfeited ... by reason of any act... committed ... without the
knowledge... of that owner." 43 The courts have not, however, inter-
preted this provision to require knowledge of the act upon which the
fofeiture is predicated. Rather, the courts have deemed owners to have
had "knowledge" if they "knew" of prior offenses on the property.'4
Courts consider general knowledge on the part of a property owner of
any past illegality that occurred on his or her property as effectively
tainting the owner's mind from that point on, stripping the owner of
his or her innocence. If owners cannot show a lack of general knowl-
edge of past wrongdoing, they can attempt to show that although they
had such knowledge, they did not consent to the offense in question;
143 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1994).
144 Moreover, notwithstanding judicial statements to the contrary, the government
need not even prove "actual" knowledge. Courts may speak of requiring "actual" knowl-
edge as opposed to "constructive" knowledge. United States v. $4,255,000, 762 F.2d 895,
905-06 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1056 (1986); United States v. 8848 S. Com-
mercial St., 757 F. Supp. 871, 882 (N.D. Ill. 1990). However, they then proceed to define
actual knowledge in such a way that it is really only "willful blindness."
Willful blindness usually refers to "a mechanism for inference [of knowledge], not...
a substitute for knowledge." United States v. One 1989 Jeep Wagoneer, 976 F.2d 1172,
1175 (8th Cir. 1992) (alterations in original) (quoting Mattingly v. United States, 924 F.2d
785 (8th Cir. 1991)). The Model Penal Code, in addressing the willful blindness concept
states: "Requirement of Knowledge Satisfied by Knowledge of High Probability. When
knowledge of the existence of a Particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge
is established if a person is aware of a high probability of its existence, unless he actually
believes that it does not exist." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(7) (Proposed Official Draft
1962).
To facilitate this slight of hand, courts typically invoke one of two metaphors. First,
courts may speak of a person "deliberately clos[ing] his eyes to the existence of facts that
would otherwise be obvious." United States v. One 1989 Jeep Wagoneer, 976 F.2d 1172,
1175 (8th Cir. 1992). Second, they may assert that an owner could only be ignorant, in the
face of substantial evidence of illegal activity, by "sticking his head in the sand." 8848 S.
Commercial St., 757 F. Supp. at 883 (citations omitted). In $4,255,000, the Eleventh Circuit
stated that when "'it is reasonable to believe that an owner of property is aware that the prop-
erty is the proceeds of narcotics transactions.... that owner is not an innocent owner.'"
762 F.2d at 906 (emphasis added) (citation omitted); see also 8848 S. Commercial St., 757 F.
Supp. at 882-83. In other words, the evidence should support an "inference" of actual
knowledge. Id.
Willful blindness, in addition to knowledge and consent, is explicitly mentioned in the
forfeiture law for conveyances, but not in that for real property or drug proceeds. See supra
notes 118-21 and accompanying text. Congress drafted the conveyances provision after it
drafted those for real property and drug proceeds. The willful blindness language was
added almost as an afterthought. See One 1989Jeep Wagoneer, 976 F.2d at 1175. This omis-
sion is ultimately inconsequential because courts might invoke the willful blindness device
to infer knowledge in any case.
CORAELL LAW REVIEW
d. Interpreting "Lack of Consent": "All Reasonable Steps" To
Prevent the Offense
Although owners are deemed to have knowledge of unlawful ac-
tivity if they merely knew about prior offenses unrelated to the specific
illegality upon which a given forfeiture action is predicated, they will
not be deemed to have consented to such activity unless they con-
sented to the specific offense on which the forfeiture action is predi-
cated. In most cases, the government will not have positive proof that
an owner actually consented to the commission of the predicate ille-
gal activity. In many cases, the property owner does not have actual
knowledge that a specific offense will occur, but might have reason to
believe (i.e., "should have known") that the offense might occur based
on knowledge of past instances of illegality. The "lack of consent"
defense would thus always work for owners if they could simply
demonstrate that they had not given their permission on that occa-
sion. The government would very rarely have hard evidence that the
owner granted such permission.
Rather than create this grand loophole for owners, most of the
circuit courts that have considered the issue have interpreted the pro-
vision in a manner that is more consistent with Congress's intent: a
property ownerfaced with a potential forfeiture must prove a lack of
"implied" or "constructive" consent, i.e., that he or she took "all rea-
sonable steps" to prevent the illegal activity.' 45 This definition incor-
145 The Sixth Circuit rejects this approach and apparently requires property owners to
produce evidence of their lack of knowledge or consent, giving those terms their ordinary
meanings. United States v. Lots 12, 13, 14, & 15, 869 F.2d 942, 946-47 (6th Cir. 1989)
(finding the "reasonable steps" requirement inapplicable due to (1) the absence of a con-
stitutional question and (2) statutory language requiring only a lack of "knowledge or con-
sent"). See also United States v. 44133 Duchess Dr., 863 F. Supp. 492, 498-99 (E.D. Mich.
1994) (stating that the Sixth Circuit does not require a claimant to prove that he or she did
everything necessary to prevent the illegal use of his or her property).
The Eighth Circuit rejected the applicability of the Calero-Toledo standard in constru-
ing willful blindness to infer knowledge in a conveyance forfeiture action.' One 1989Jeep
Wagoneer, 976 F.2d at 1174. The court stated that "[the] statutory language, not the Caero-
Toledo constitutional doctrine, is at issue in this case." Id. at 1175. The Eighth Circuit has
not yet addressed the question in the context of construing consent.
Both the Second and Third Circuits have embraced the Calero-Toledo standard as ap-
propriately applied to the statutory defense. See United States v. 141st St. Corp., 911 F.2d
870, 879 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1109 (1991); United States v. 6109 Grubb Rd.,
886 F.2d 618, 623 (3d Cir. 1989). The Third Circuit, however, remanded for the district
court to consider the applicability of the Calero-Toledo reasonable-steps standard. Id. at 625.
In United States v. 15603 85th Ave. N., 933 F.2d 976 (11th Cir. 1991), the Eleventh Circuit
applied the Calero-Toledo standard to forfeitures of drug proceeds. The Eleventh Circuit
applies the same standard to real property forfeitures as well, because both the drug pro-
ceeds and real property forfeiture provisions contain "identically worded innocent owner-
ship exception[s]." United States v. 1012 Germantown Rd., 963 F.2d 1496, 1505 (11th Cir.
1992). The Ninth Circuit also implicitly adopted Calero-Toledo in rejecting an "innocent
owner" defense where'the claimant's testimony showed negligence, stating that "[f]ailure
to exercise due care precludes reliance upon the innocent owner defense." United States
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porates the narrow Cazleo-Toledo standard for a constitutionally-based
innocent owner claim.146
One might expect the law to penalize property owners who do
not take reasonable measures to protect their property from illegal
use, yet it is not obvious from the language of § 881 that Congress
intended merely to codify the constitutional defense, thus adding
nothing to the protection already accorded innocent owners. The
dictionary definition of the word "consent," for example, suggests that
an owner must have performed some positive act of approval.147
Nonetheless, the courts find "consent" even where an owner ex-
pressed disapproval, but did not otherwise do enough to prevent the
offense from occurring. Courts will find an owner who has knowledge
of illegal conduct and who does nothing about it to have "consented"
to that conduct as a matter of law. Indeed, even if an owner takes
steps to eradicate the illegal activity, courts may still find consent if the
owner does not take "all reasonable steps" to prevent a subsequent
criminal offense.
III
CIVIL ASSET FomRITuRE CROSSES THE THRESHOLD
The civil asset forfeiture laws turn our laissezfaire system ofjustice
on its head. Ordinarily, citizens rely on the police to investigate
crimes, conduct searches and make arrests, and the law imposes no
duties on private individuals to perform the work of police officers. 148
The forfeiture laws, however, single out property owners and require
them, under threat of punishment, to police their property for illegal
use. The law subjects property owners' actions to heightened scrutiny
and holds them responsible for the illegal acts of others if they fail to
report the offenses or fail to take other steps to prevent illegal activity
on the premises.
v. $215,300, 882 F.2d 417, 420 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub nom., Arboleola v. United
States, 497 U.S. 1005 (1990). The court cited its decision in United States v. One 1972
Chevrolet Blazer, 563 F.2d 1386, 1389 (9th Cir. 1977), for this proposition; that case, how-
ever, addressed the constitutional, not the statutory, standard.
146 The Second Circuit's decisions indicate an apparent shift from a somewhat lenient
standard to the more exacting Calero-Toledo standard. In United States v. 41.8 57th Street,
922 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1990), the Second Circuit announced a more lenient rule:
"[F]orfeiture is inappropriate where an owner can prove reasonable efforts were made, under
the circumstances, to prevent illegal use of the property." Id. at 130 (emphasis added). The
court did not require the property owner to make "all" reasonable efforts and permitted
consideration of the peculiar circumstances of each case, rather than imposing a purely
objective "reasonableness" test. In a later decision, 141st St. Corp., the Second Circuit ex-
plicity applied the Calero-Toledo standard and required that an owner take "all reasonable
steps" to prevent the wrongful use of his or her property. 911 F.2d at 879. See also United
States v. 19 & 25 Castle St., 31 F.3d 35, 40 (2d Cir. 1994).
147 See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
148 See supra notes 31-48 and accompanying text.
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In the family context, the forfeiture laws have the effect of trans-
ferring decisionmaking authority regarding family life from individual
family members to the judiciary and the law enforcement establish-
ment. Unlike other explicit attempts to regulate family life, 149 the as-
set forfeiture laws do not focus on family members per se; the effect
on the family is incidental. Nevertheless, many federal courts have
not trod lightly in this area; they have, to the contrary, brought the
full force of federal confiscation power to bear on family members
who have not fulfilled the perceived duties of citizenship imposed on
them by the courts via the "reasonable steps" test.
The following sections address the duties courts have implicitly
imposed on property-owning family members in articulating the "rea-
sonable steps" expected of them in the civil drug asset forfeiture con-
text. These sections focus on the two most common family scenarios:
uninvolved wives with drug-dealing husbands and uninvolved parents
with drug-dealing children. These scenarios raise troubling issues be-
cause they thrust courts squarely inside those complicated relation-
ships and call on federal judges to rule on the propriety of a wife's
behavior toward her husband or a parent's behavior toward a child.
A. "A Woman's Work is Never Done": The Duties of the
Uninvolved Wife of a Drug Dealer
Without exception, drug forfeiture cases implicating spousal
property involve a drug-dealing husband and a wife who has little or
no knowledge of, or who may play only a minor role in, the illegal
activity.150 Of course, if a wife actively participates in the drug activity,
a court will not view her as an innocent owner because she herself
could be prosecuted for a drug offense.151 The interesting cases in-
149 See supra notes 49-69 and accompanying text.
150 See United States v. 6109 Grubb Rd., 708 F. Supp. 698, 703 (W.D. Pa.), vacated on
other ground, 886 F.2d 618 (3d Cir.), reh'g denied, 890 F.2d 659 (3d Cir. 1989); United States
v. Sixty Acres (Sixty Acres I), 727 F. Supp. 1414, 1415 (N.D. Ala. 1990), rev'd, 930 F.2d 857
(11th Cir. 1991); United States v. Property Titled in the Names of Ponce, 751 F. Supp.
1436, 1437 (D. Haw. 1990); see also United States v. 5.382 Acres, 871 F. Supp. 880 (W.D. Va.
1994), affd, United States v. Fisher, 61 F.3d 901 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. 44133
Duchess Dr., 863 F. Supp. 492, 499 (E.D. Mich. 1994); United States v. 281 Syosset Wood-
bury Rd., 862 F. Supp. 847 (E.D.N.Y. 1994), aff'd 71 F.3d 1067 (2d Cir. 1995); United
States v. 1419 Mount Alto Rd., 830 F. Supp. 1476 (N.D. Ga. 1993); United States v. 110
Collier Dr., 793 F. Supp. 1048 (N.D. Ala. 1992); United States v. 9818 S.W. 94 Terrace, 788
F. Supp. 561 (S.D. Fla. 1992), aff'd, 983 F.2d 1083 (1 th Cir. 1993); United States v. 5854 N.
Kenmore, 762 F. Supp. 204 (N.D. Ill. 1991); United States v. 343 E. 12th Ave., 755 F. Supp.
823 (C.D. II. 1991); United States v. 11885 S.W. 46 St., 715 F. Supp. 355 (S.D. Fla. 1990);
United States v. 19026 Oakmont S. Dr., 715 F. Supp. 233 (N.D. Ind. 1989); United States v.
3201 Caughey Rd., 715 F. Supp. 131 (W.D. Pa. 1989), affid 945 F.2d 387 (3d Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 505 U.S. 1076 (1992); United States v. 15621 S.W. 209th Ave., 699 F. Supp. 1531
(S.D. Fla. 1988), affd, 894 F.2d 511 (11th Cir. 1990).




volve wives who may have some knowledge of the illegal conduct but
who do little or nothing to prevent it. The case law makes clear that
courts will deem these wives to have consented to the illegal acts and
will permit forfeiture of the wives' interests in their homes.152 For
most other offenses, an innocent spouse's failure to take action to stop
her husband's illegal acts would not result in her punishment.153 In
civil asset forfeiture cases, on the other hand, in conducting the "rea-
sonable steps" analysis, courts have entered the realm of domestic
married life and have begun to fashion a common law regarding the
proper role of the wife/citizen.
In virtually every published case involving spouses, the wife either
had no knowledge of, or took no steps to prevent, the illegal conduct.
Thus, the courts have not had occasion to determine the reasonable-
ness of a wife's conduct toward her husband, nor have they suggested
steps that a wife could reasonably take. In spousal cases, unlike in
parent-child cases, courts cannot recommend eviction of the spouse
engaging in the illegal conduct because the property is jointly
owned.' 54 One district court, however, did suggest "[a] s pure specula-
tion, [that] perhaps [the wife] was required to seek a divorce in order
to divorce herself from this possible result."' 55 In United States v. 6109
Grubb Road, the government took the position thatJane DiLoretto, the
wife of a drug dealer and mother of five minor children, should have
sought partition of the family home which she and her husband
owned by tenancy in the entireties. 156 The Third Circuit disagreed,
finding that such a suggestion "not only lacks legal substance but, in
any event, defies marital reality."157
The suggestions of partition and divorce are, practically speaking,
one and the same. Partition usually requires a spouse to obtain a di-
vorce, after which the spouse would be entitled to half of the couple's
jointly-owned property. Some states also allow one spouse to partition
152 See, e.g., 9818 S.W. 94 Terrace, 788 F. Supp. at 565 (property forfeited because wife
knew of husband's drug dealings in home and took no action to stop it); United States v.
717 Woodard St., 804 F. Supp. 716, 724 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (same); Sixty Acres , 727 F. Supp. at
1420-21 (same); 19026 Oakmont So. Dr., 715 F. Supp. at 237 (same); 3201 Caughey Rd., 715
F. Supp. at 134-35 (same); cf United States v. 138 Colton St., 789 F. Supp. 74, 77-78 (D.
Conn. 1991) (same, but forfeiture predicated on illegal gambling offense).
153 Most forfeiture cases involve drug offenses, but other civil asset forfeiture laws ap-
ply to violations of other criminal laws. These forfeiture statutes involve the same "reason-
able steps" analysis and thus impose the same duties on family members. See, e.g., 138 Colton
St., 789 F. Supp. at 75 (forfeiture of family home because of husband's illegal gambling);
see also supra notes 16-69 and accompanying text (addressing the American legal tradition
that fails to impose legal duties on citizens to assist in police investigations).
154 See supra notes 5-8 and infra notes 203-22 and accompanying text (discussing evic-
tion in parent-child cases).
155 Sixty Acres , 727 F. Supp. at 1421.




marital real property on account of misconduct by the other spouse.
The spouse would, however, probably have to state a basis for the
need to partition, requiring the spouse to reveal her husband's drug
dealing to a court and thereby subjecting him to the risk of criminal
prosecution.158
Alternatively, a spouse could, as suggested in the parent-child
context in 19 & 25 Castle Street,' 59 go directly to the police with infor-
mation regarding her husband's criminal activities, which should suf-
fice to avoid forfeiture of her interest in the property. Taking this
step, however, would alert the police to bring a forfeiture action
against her husband's interest in the home, again leaving the wife with
only half of their jointly-owned property. Reporting her husband
would also likely result in termination of their marriage. To suggest
that the law expects wives to divorce their husbands to avoid legal pun-
ishment flies in the face of the policies underlying the spousal testi-
mony privileges 60 and the general legal tradition that protects the
integrity of the family and the home.' 6'
In cases in which wives have knowledge of their husbands' wrong-
doing, the question arises: What conduct should reasonably be ex-
pected of a wife who lives in fear of physical abuse by her husband? It
should not be surprising that some wives of drug dealers have claimed
that their husbands abused them. 62 In one case, a woman testified
that she had warned her husband that she would destroy his drugs the
following day if he did not do so himself. 63 She would have taken this
action, she stated, even if it would have resulted in her "get[ting] lick-
158 In a few community property states, a spouse may seek separation of the commu-
nity property if that spouse's interest in the property is threatened by the misconduct of
the other spouse. See, e.g., LA. Crw. CODE ANN. art. 2374 (West 1985 & Supp. 1995); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 766.70(4) (a) (West 1993).
159 See supra notes 5-8 and infra notes 191-217 and accompanying text.
160 See supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text. Indeed, under a forfeiture regime
that places the burden on the property owner to prove her innocence by disclaiming any
knowledge of her husband's wrongdoing, a wife who goes forward with an innocent owner
defense will be deemed to have waived her spousal communications privilege. Having
placed her knowledge of her husband's wrongdoing in issue, the government will then
have the opportunity to question her on any and all illegal activities her husband may have
discussed with her, even if they occurred outside of the home. Thus, in drug cases involv-
ing family home forfeitures, wives have the unenviable choice of either not defending
against the forfeiture, or taking the stand against their husbands concerning offenses that
may have occurred outside of the home. See United States v. 281 Syosset Woodbury Rd.,
862 F. Supp. 847, 855 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (raising an innocent owner defense "put [the claim-
ant's] confidential communications with her husband at issue"), aft', 71 F.3d 1067 (2d
Cir. 1995).
161 See supra notes 17-49 and accompanying text.
162 See, e.g., United States v. Sixty Acres, 930 F.2d 857, 860 (11th Cir. 1991); United
States v. Property Titled in the Names of Ponce, 751 F. Supp. 1436, 1437 (D. Haw. 1991).
163 Property Titled in the Names of Poncre 751 F. Supp. at 1437.
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ings."' 64 The court ignored this aspect of her claim, focusing instead
on the question of whether, by giving her husband a day to destroy
the drugs, she had unreasonably delayed taking action, thereby effec-
tively consenting to his drug dealing. 65
In United States v. Sixty Acres, the government confiscated an Ala-
bama farm and residence because of the husband's substantial mari-
juana dealings on the property. 6 6 The district court found the wife's
testimony and other evidence of her fear of her husband to be credi-
ble.'6 7 Nonetheless, the court found that she consented to the illegal
activity on her property because she had not taken all reasonable steps
to prevent the offenses. The court wrote:
At some point the obligations of citizenship in a drug-ridden society
must overcome spousal loyalty and even spousal intimidation....
Mrs. Ellis did not offer proof of the kind or character of duress or of
control or of dominance which would have precluded her from ex-
ercising the degree of responsibility of citizenship which required
her to take at least some overt action to deter her husband's course
of action.168
Thus, the court concluded that "'consent' can be implied [sic] to a
wife, even a wife dominated by an overbearing and abusive husband, if
that wife takes no affirmative action whatsoever to stop her husband's
criminal activity.., except perhaps to object verbally in a bland and
ineffective way."16 9
164 Id.
165 Id. at 1441-42. Because the court considered the wife's claim on a motion for sum-
mary judgment by the government, the court needed only to decide whether her claim
raised a genuine issue of material fact. The court did not enter a final ruling regarding the
adequacy of her conduct in establishing non-consent. I. at 1442.
166 United States v. Sixty Acres (Sixty Acres I), 727 F. Supp. 1414, 1416 (N.D. Ala.
1990), revd, 930 F.2d 857 (11th Cir. 1991).
167 The court wrote:
When [the F.B.I. agent] interviewed Mrs. Ellis [after her husband's arrest],
Mrs. Ellis denied any knowledge of her husband's current drug dealings
but went on to say that she had lived in fear of bodily harm from him. On
this point, this court believes that what Mrs. Ellis told Agent Rasner is true.
In other words, if Mrs. Ellis had undertaken to squeal on her husband or to
kick him out of the house as a means of avoiding... [forfeiture], she
probably would have placed herself in personal jeopardy. The degree of
her endangerment is unknown, and probably unknowable. She took no
affirmative action to stop her criminally inclined husband from conducting
his drug enterprise unless it was, perhaps, to nag him until he told her in
no uncertain terms to mind her own business. In a sense, she watched and
waited with a feeling of helplessness....
Id. at 1416. The court also heard testimony regarding an interview with Mrs. Ellis's teenage
daughter who said that she was scared of Mr. Ellis and "did not know what he would do to
her mother, if she talked to [the police]." Id. (quoting narcotics officer's testimony).
168 Id. at 1420.
169 Id. at 1421.
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However, the same district court later granted Mrs. Ellis a new
trial to allow her to present additional evidence of her fear of her
husband. 170 The court heard testimony that Mr. Ellis had served a
prison term for beating his first wife to death and that Mrs. Ellis
learned this shortly after marrying him.171 Furthermore, Mr. Ellis had
previously choked Mrs. Ellis and threatened to kill her if she tried to
leave him. A witness testified that Mr. Ellis would have killed his wife
if she had reported him to the police. Mr. Ellis drank heavily and
owned several guns, including a semi-automatic rifle. In general, he
frightened his wife and other relatives and forced them to do his bid-
ding. One government witness even described him as a "madman."172
The district court found the testimony to be credible, even accepting
a characterization of Mrs. Ellis as her husband's "slave," and dismissed
the government's forfeiture complaint with prejudice.173
The Eleventh Circuit reversed, finding that Mrs. Ellis's "battered
wife" claim did not satisfy the elements of a duress defense. The court
stated:
Mrs. Ellis' generalized fear of persecution from her husband.., does
not allow her to escape the consequences, (in this case, forfeiture),
for her consent to his illegal acts. We may not substitute, as the
district court appeared to do, a vaguely-defined theory of "battered
wife syndrome" for the showing of duress courts have always re-
quired to excuse otherwise criminal conduct. 174
Mrs. Ellis was not, however, charged with criminal conduct; she
merely sought to avoid civil forfeiture. Nonetheless, her "generalized"
fear did not excuse her from taking steps against her husband. The
court imported the duress defense from criminal law, which requires
proof of a "well-founded fear of impending death or serious bodily
harm,"175 into the civil forfeiture context. Unless her husband had
threatened "immediate harm which the coerced party cannot reason-
ably escape,"176 Mrs. Ellis could not prove duress.
In other cases, courts have found that wives did not have knowl-
edge of their husbands' criminal activities, even in situations in which
strong circumstantial evidence suggested that they did know.' 77 Such
170 United States v. Sixty Acres (Sixty Acres II), 736 F. Supp. 1579 (N.D. Ala. 1990).
171 Id. at 1582.
172 Id. at 1583.
173 Id.
174 United States v. Sixty Acres, 980 F.2d 857, 860 (11th Cir. 1991).
175 Id.
176 Id. at 861.
177 See, e.g., United States v. 116 Emerson SL, 942 F.2d 74, 80 (1st Cir. 1991) (district
court found that wife had no knowledge of drugs found in microwave oven even though
wife did all the cooking and cleaning for the household); United States v. 44133 Duchess
Dr., 863 F. Supp. 492, 499 (E.D. Mich. 1994) (wife had knowledge of husband's drug deal-
ing, but did not know it occurred in the home); United States v. 11885 S.W. 46 St., 751 F.
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liberal applications of the "innocent owner" defense may indicate re-
luctance on the part of some judges to dispossess uninvolved wives
and innocent children of their family homes, even if the wives are
arguably not "innocent" under the law.
Even if a court finds a wife to be an innocent owner, such a ruling
does not necessarily mean that she and her children (if she has any)
may go on with their lives as usual. The "innocent owner" defense
entitles a woman to retain ownership of only her share of the property
that she and her husband jointly own. Assuming that her husband is
found to be guilty, the court must then determine the wife's interest
in the property under state marital property laws. 178 In a number of
states, the marital property laws treat spousal ownership of real prop-
erty as a tenancy by the entireties, granting each spouse an indivisible
interest in the entire property, regardless of the circumstances. 179
Thus, if a woman establishes her "innocence," she would be entitled
to keep the property in its entirety, and the government could not
confiscate any part of it.180 In other states, the entireties property be-
comes subject to partition upon forfeiture of one spouse's interest.181
The federal forfeiture laws thus apply differently depending on the
state in which the property is located.
In those states requiring partition of entireties properties, a wife
will receive one-half of the proceeds of the sale of her home. Obvi-
ously, this leaves her in a much worse position than before the forfei-
ture. She will have to find another place to live and will only have a
fraction of her previous home's worth with which to acquire the new
housing.'8 2 Harming an innocent wife in this manner may be uncon-
stitutional. 183 Affirming a lower court's ruling that Florida law re-
quires that a wife retain the entire property after partition, the
Eleventh Circuit stated in dictum that the conversion of a tenancy by
the entireties to a tenancy in common (so that partition upon forfei-
ture of the husband's interest could occur) would violate the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 184
Supp. 355, 357 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (wife did not know about husband's drug dealing, which
ultimately yielded him a 10-year prison sentence).
178 See, e.g., 116 Emerson St., 942 F.2d at 79 n.3 (applying Rhode Island law); United
States v. 15621 S.W. 209th Ave., 894 F.2d 1513, 1514 (1lth Cir. 1990) (applying Florida
law); 44133 Duchess Dr., 863 F. Supp. at 500 (applying Michigan law); United States v. 1419
Mount Alto Rd., 830 F. Supp. 1476, 1480 (N.D. Ga. 1993) (applying Georgia law).
179 See 15621 S.W. 209th Ave., 894 F.2d at 1519 n.9 (listing 15 states).
180 Id. at 1519.
181 See, e.g., 116 Emerson St., 942 F.2d at 77 (wife entitled to 50% share in property,
other 50% forfeited to government).
182 If the government sells the home at public auction, it will probably not even fetch
its fair market value because auctioned properties often sell at below market prices.




The couples involved in forfeiture cases often have young chil-
dren. In United States v. 6109 Grubb Road, for example, five minor chil-
dren claimed innocent ownership status. 185 They argued that as
children of the owners and residents of the home, they had a posses-
sory and future interest in the property at issue.186 The district court,
however, disagreed, finding that the children did not have any pres-
ent ownership interest but only "a mere expectancy of inheritance"
and, therefore, that the children lacked standing to assert a claim to
the property. 87 This ruling is clearly correct under the law as written,
but the effect is to punish innocent children for the "sins" of their
parents. The district court acknowledged this effect, observing:
While we are not unmindful of the grave consequences arising from
the forfeiture of a 'family home' where minor children are involved,
we are constrained by the clear language of the statute. If some
further exemption is to be carved out of § 881 for the benefit of
minor children, it must be done by Congress.' 88
B. Punishing the Parents for the Sins of the Children
In reading the parent-child forfeiture cases, one discovers com-
mon characteristics in the families' circumstances. Most cases involve
an older, single mother who works full-time and owns a modest home.
These mothers often live with their adult or minor children who fre-
quently have young children of their own. The number of family
members ranges from as few as five or six to as many as eighteen.' 8 9
The older children may have keys to the home or a separate room or
185 708 F. Supp. 698, 704 (W.D. Pa.), vacated in part on other grounds, 886 F.2d 618 (3d
Cir.), rehg denied, 890 F.2d 659 (3d Cir. 1989).
186 Id.
187 Id. See also United States v. 3201 Caughey Rd., 715 F. Supp. 131, 132 (W.D. Pa.
1989) (court had previously rejected claim brought by sons), af'd, 945 F.2d 397 (3d Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1076 (1992).
188 6109 Grubb Rd., 708 F. Supp. at 704.
189 See, e.g., United States v. 3855 S. April St., 797 F. Supp. 933 (M.D. Ala. 1992) (single
69-year old mother with 6th grade education lived with two of her 10 children and two
grandchildren); United States v. 4.14 Acres, 801 F. Supp. 737 (S.D. Ga. 1992) (single
mother with fifth-grade education worked 9:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. and 11:00 p.m. to 4:00
a.m. six days a week and lived with three adult children and two grandchildren); United
States v. One Tract of Real Prop., 803 F. Supp. 1080 (E.D.N.C. 1992) (single mother lived
with four adult children, ages 19-25, and three grandchildren); United States v. 417 E.
Grand Ave., 777 F. Supp. 1455 (W.D. Ark. 1991) (66-year-old widowed grandmother
worked from 4:30 am. to 2:00 p.m. and lived with six grandchildren and four paid board-
ers); United States v. 908 T St., N.W., 770 F. Supp. 697 (D.D.G. 1991) (single father of nine
adult children and at least one adult grandchild, most of whom lived in his three-story
house); United States v. 121 Nostrand Ave., 760 F. Supp. 1015 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (single,
working mother with 17 children and grandchildren lived in three-bedroom apartment);
United States v. Rt. 1 Box 137 Randolph, 743 F. Supp. 802 (M.D. Ala. 1990) (nephew lived
with uncle and aunt in their mobile home).
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apartment that they may share with siblings.'9 0 In each case, at least
one of the children becomes involved in drug use and drug sales, usu-
ally as a small-time, street-level dealer.
Generally, as with spousal cases, the close quarters and the fact
that the police may have made previous arrests of the children or con-
ducted searches of the premises indicates that the parents have
"knowledge" of past drug sales on the property.' 9 ' In United States v.
19 & 25 Castle Street, for example, the court found that the parents
had "knowledge" of their children's criminal activity even though the
evidence suggested that they believed that the drug activity had
ceased. Although the couple had full knowledge of their children's
past drug-related activities, the evidence showed that their four adult
male children had attempted to conceal the fact that the drug use and
sales continued:
[1]t appears that the children, despite the intervention of their par-
ents, continued to use narcotics, hid the narcotics from Mr. and
Mrs. Gonzalez and repeatedly lied to them regarding their narcot-
ics-related activity.
[One son] kept his operations hidden from his parents by con-
ducting sales from the residence only in their absence and moving
sales down the street when they returned home from work.' 92
The court nonetheless found that the parents had knowledge of the
narcotics distribution on their property because they knew of past
drug activity.193 In other cases, however, the parents have avoided for-
feiture by convincing a court that their children kept their drug activ-
ity hidden from them. 194
Parents who themselves become involved in the drug business' 95
or who knowingly accept the proceeds of drug offenses, 196 are, of
190 See, e.g., United States v. 19 & 25 Castle St., 31 F.3d 35, 37 (2d Cir. 1994) (a child
lived in separate apartment on the premises); 908 TSt., N.W., 770 F. Supp. at 701 (children
had keys and their own rooms).
191 19 & 25 Castle St., 31 F.3d at 39; United States v. 4.14 Acres, 801 F. Supp. 737, 741
(S.D. Ga. 1992); United States v. 3855 S. April St., 797 F. Supp. 933, 936 (M.D. Ala. 1992).
192 19 & 25 Castle St., 31 F.3d at 37-38.
193 Id. at 39. But see 908 TSt., N.W., 770 F. Supp. at 703 (father had knowledge of past
offenses, but may not have known of further violations and, in any case, took all reasonable
steps to prevent them).
194 United States v. 12110 S.W. 92nd St., 821 F. Supp. 666, 670 (S.D. Fla. 1993); United
States v. 750 E. Shore Dr., 800 F. Supp. 547, 550 (E.D. Mich. 1992); United States v. 121
Nostrand Ave., 760 F. Supp. 1015, 1033 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
195 See, e.g., United States v. 101 Kimberly Ave., 765 F. Supp. 39 (D. Conn. 1991)
(mother involved in son's drug operation); United States v. Route 2, Box 61-C, 727 F.
Supp. 1295 (W.D. Ark. 1990) (same).
196 United States v. 2511 E. Fairmount Ave., 737 F. Supp. 878 (D. Md. 1990) (parent
knowingly accepted drug proceeds to purchase house); United States v. 2511 E. Fairmount
Ave., 722 F. Supp. 1273 (D. Md. 1989) (same).
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course, not even remotely "innocent." But in most cases, the parents
are hardworking individuals with no criminal history who do not ap-
prove of their children's unlawful behavior.197 Such cases turn on the
"consent" element of the "innocent owner" defense: did the parents
take steps to stop their children's drug activities, and did these steps
amount to "all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the ille-
gal activity"? 198
Federal courts vary in their application of this test and in their
criteria for determining what steps are "reasonably" to be expected of
parents. In United States v. 19 & 25 Castle Street, for example, the par-
ents had taken a number of measures to set their children straight:
[T] hey sought to help the children end their narcotics dependence.
For example, they sent Benjamin, Renaldo and Doraida at different
times to live in Florida to get away from the local narcotics environ-
ment. However, they all eventually returned to New Haven. Mrs.
Gonzalez also sought to enroll Jose in a drug rehabilitation pro-
gram, but was informed that, since Jose was an adult, he had to
enter the program voluntarily.' 99
They had also taken steps to end the drug activity in their
neighborhood:
They [had] asked the drug dealers to move away and reported the
narcotics activity [on Castle Street] to the police. The dealers retali-
ated against them by throwing a rock through a window and vandal-
izing their fruit trees. The attacks discouraged Mr. and Mrs.
Gonzalez from seeking to prevent further narcotics activity.200
Despite these efforts, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's
ruling that the parents had not proven their innocence because they
had not taken all reasonable steps to prevent the criminal activity.201
The court indicated that to protect against forfeiture, Mr. and
Mrs. Gonzalez should have conducted searches of the premises. 202
Presumably this means that the parents should have inspected the per-
sonal belongings of their adult children, presumably without giving
them notice and notwithstanding their possible objections. No other
court has suggested that parents take such measures. However, this
seemed reasonable to the court in 19 & 25 Castle Street inasmuch as
the parents had allowed their children to live in the home they owned
and had knowledge that the police had previously confiscated drugs
there.
197 See supra note 189 (listing relevant cases).
198 United States v. 19 & 25 Castle St., 31 F.3d 35, 39 (2d Cir. 1994).
199 Id. at 37.
200 Id. at 38.




The only step certain to establish parents' innocence is the re-
moval of the children from the home, either by reporting them to the
police or by evicting them. The only single father to appear in these
cases evicted his problem children and took steps to prevent them
from re-entering the home.203 William Akers had a house full of chil-
dren and grandchildren, and he knew that some of his children had
conducted drug deals at and had brought weapons into the home.20 4
Mr. Akers's daughter testified that:
[H] er father put Kathy and Jeffrey out of the house and that her
father took certain measures so that they would not "sneak back in."
For example, he nailed up windows, put locks on the doors, "things
like that." She further explained that [since the penultimate police
raid of the home] there was no reason to believe that her father's
home was being used for the facilitation of narcotics activities: Her
addicted siblings "had been put out" of the house "to fend for them-
selves"; no one living permanently at 908 T Street, N.W. during that
time used drugs; and Gregory, when he was released from prison in
1987 or early 1988, was living at a halfway house where he was moni-
tored, was permitted to visit with his family every weekend, consist-
ently tested negative for drugs, and attended a narcotics
rehabilitation program.205
Without saying whether eviction was required, the court found the
father's conduct sufficient to establish his innocence, based upon his
demonstrated lack of consent to his children's criminal activities.20 6
In a similar case, Mrs. Gantt, a sixty-nine-year old widow with a
sixth-grade education, had a serious problem with nonresidents deal-
ing drugs in front of her home.207 The police had received many calls
about the area and had made numerous arrests in front of the
home.208 The suspects sometimes evaded arrest by running into Mrs.
Gantt's home through the front door, which her young grandchildren
often left unlocked.20 9
Mrs. Gantt took numerous steps to stop the drug activity on her
property. She evicted her own drug-dealing children, and she and a
son frequently reported the drug activity in front of the house to the
police. Mrs. Gantt also attempted to call the investigating officer,
Lieutenant Armstead, at the number he had left, but was unable to
203 United States v. 908 T St., N.W., 770 F. Supp. 697, 703 (D.D.C. 1991).
204 Id. at 699-701.
205 Id. at 701. The court found the testimony of his daughter, who "was working at the
University of the District of Columbia and, in the evenings at a law office as an account-
ant," to be "exceedingly impressive and credible: She was poised, articulate, intelligent,
and consistent." Id. at 701-04.
206 Id.
207 United States v. 3855 S. April St., 797 F. Supp. 933, 933-35 (M.D. Ala. 1992).




reach him. Her daughter posted a "No Trespassing" sign in the front
yard. In addition, Mrs. Gantt attempted to keep her front door locked
to prevent drug dealers from running into her house to evade the
police.21 0
Unsatisfied with her efforts, the government argued that she
should have agreed to "swear out warrants for the arrest of any of the
suspects; ... to contact Armstead at the telephone number that he
gave her; and... [should have kept] the deadbolt on the front door
drawn at all times. '211 Although the court agreed that Mrs. Gantt
could have provided more assistance to the police, the court distin-
guished the requirement that an owner take all reasonable steps to
prevent criminal activity from the requirement that they take all possi-
ble steps to do so: "[T]o require property owners to take all possible
steps 'would result in the dangerous precedent of making property
owners in drug-infested neighborhoods into substitute police
forces."'212 In assessing whether the steps Mrs. Gantt took sufficed,
the court "view[ed] the facts in light of the particular claimant's indi-
vidual situation and personal limitations."213 Few other courts have
explicitly interpreted the reasonable steps test to take into account an
individual claimant's "situation and personal limitations. '21 4 The
court concluded that Mrs. Gantt took all reasonable steps to prevent
the drug activity on her property.215
The four federal courts that have considered whether the reason-
able steps analysis should require parents to either report their chil-
dren to the police or evict them have split on the question. In 19 &
25 Castle Street, the Second Circuit found it reasonable to impose this
choice of duties on parents. Although the court understood the par-
ents' reluctance to take further action against neighborhood drug
dealers for fear of retaliation, the court nonetheless held that "it
would not have been unreasonable for them to ask the police to take
some action in regard to the narcotics activity at their dwelling. "216
The court also suggested that they should have issued an ultimatum to
210 Id. at 938.
211 Id.
212 Id. at 938 n.9 (quoting United States v. 710 Main St., 753 F. Supp. 121, 125
(S.D.N.Y. 1990)).
213 Id. at 938.
214 See, e.g., United States v. 12110 S.W. 92nd St., 821 F. Supp. 666, 669-70 (S.D. Fla.
1993) (applying reasonableness analysis, taking into account the claimant's age, the fact
that she worked long hours five days a week and that she had "expressed antipathy to
drugs," and her demonstrated "dedication to maintaining and preserving the family").
215 3855 S. April St., 797 F. Supp. at 939 (citing United States v. 908 T St., N.W., 770 F.
Supp. 697 (D.D.C. 1991), as representative of the steps a homeowner should take to avoid
forfeiture).
216 United States v. 19 & 25 Castle St., 31 F.3d 35, 40 (2d Cir. 1994).
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their children: "Comply with the law or move out."2 17 (Of course, if
the parents honestly believed that the drug activity had ended, there
would have been no need for them to issue this ultimatum.) In the
end, the parents lost their home for failing to take all the steps the
court believed were reasonably expected.
The District Court for the Southern District of Georgia similarly
approved the forfeiture of the home of a hard-working, single mother
with a fifth-grade education because she had failed to report or evict
her drug-dealing and drug-addicted daughters:
In the case at bar, Easter Mae Jenkins "fussed" at her daughter Jen-
nifer for using drugs and told her daughters that she did not want
any drugs in the house. Despite her belief that her pleas would be
sufficient, she should have called the police department or the
Drug Enforcement Agency for help with her children.... She did
not throw her daughters out of the house because she was con-
cerned about providing shelter for their young children. Although
Ms. Jenkins' maternal love and concern for her grandchildren are
certainly commendable, her actions do not constitute reasonable ef-
forts to prevent the use of her property in drug transactions.218
The court felt constrained to follow precedent and it, like the court in
3855 South April Street, also cited United States v. 908 T Street, N. W. as a
model of what couris expect of homeowners.2 19 The court ordered
forfeiture "with great regret," describing the punishment as "unduly
harsh"220 and explaining:
Although loss of the family dwelling will somewhat punish Sharon,
the perpetrator of the Title 21 offenses, Easter Mae Jenkins will bear
the full effect of the forfeiture. She loses the home that she pru-
dently purchased with proceeds from her husband's wrongful death
settlement because she continued to provide for her daughters
through hard work even when their treatment of her was reprehen-
sible and their respect for her minimal. Unfortunately, the law re-
quires this result.2 21
Two other district courts have taken the contrary position, find-
ing it unreasonable to require parents to evict their children. In
United States v. 1105 W. 92nd Street, for example, the court observed
that "it would not have been reasonable for an elderly woman to evict
217 Id.
218 United States v. 4.14 Acres, 801 F. Supp. 737, 742-43 (S.D. Ga. 1992) (citation
omitted).





her son and his entire family from her home, especially in light of her
apparent dedication to maintaining and preserving the family."222
IV
THOUGHTS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR A MORE HUMANE
APPROACH TO CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE IN
FAMILY SETTINGS
The practice of visiting the sins of one family member on another
sacrifices the interests of the uninvolved person for the societal good
of deterring wrongdoing. It threatens the special bond of love and
loyalty that exists between family members. The failure to make an
exception for family situations in the application of civil forfeiture
laws ignores those important emotional and psychological bonds. It
also ignores the moral, cultural, and religious beliefs that may require
family members to give shelter and protection to each other in the
face of government pressure to betray them.
In a family setting, the forfeiture rules can have a detrimental
impact on family relationships and on the long-term development of
individuals within the family. The spousal property cases demonstrate
a callous indifference to gender-related issues of power and authority.
The Eleventh Circuit's decision in Sixty AcrS223 epitomizes the cruelty
of the forfeiture regime, dispossessing an uninvolved wife because she
had failed to report her husband to the police, even though she rea-
sonably believed that had she done so, her husband would have retali-
ated against her, inflicting serious bodily harm or even killing her. In
the words of the Third Circuit, the forfeiture cases "defy marital real-
ity" by expecting wives, who may be responsible for young children
and financially dependent on their husbands for support,224 to either
report their spouses to the police or file for divorce.
The parent-child cases likewise disregard the reality of family life
by encouraging the parents of teenage or young adult children via the
"reasonable steps" test to (1) search their children's possessions; (2)
report their children's illegal activity to the police; or (3) evict their
children from the home. Parents may oppose random searches be-
222 United States v. 12110 S.W. 92nd St., 821 F. Supp. 660, 670 (S.D. Fla. 1993); see also
United States v. 417 E. Grand Ave., 777 F. Supp. 1455, 1457 (W.D. Ark. 1991) ("The claim-
ant cannot reasonably be expected to turn her own grandson out into the street.").
223 United States v. Sixty Acres, 930 F.2d 857 (l1th Cir. 1991); see supra text accompa-
nying notes 166-76.
224 This is not to suggest that these women live off the proceeds of drug selling, the
cases indicate that these families instead rely on legitimate income for their primary sup-
port. This author reviewed only two cases in which the property owners knowingly used
drug proceeds to pay for their property. See United States v. 2511 E. Fairmount Ave., 722 F.
Supp. 1273, 1281 (D. Md. 1989); United States v. 19026 Oakmont S. Dr., 715 F. Supp. 233,
237 (N.D. Ind. 1989).
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cause they may reasonably believe in the need to respect their older
children's privacy. They may, in other words, view establishing and
maintaining trust between themselves and their children as the key to
effective parenting.
Parents may also oppose the second and third options, prefer-
ring, when they discover illegal activity in the home, to take measures
that fall short of reporting their children to the authorities or evicting
them. Parents may believe that through stern, caring discussions, in-
trafamily discipline, and demonstrated faith in the ability of their chil-
dren to improve, the family stands a better chance at rehabilitating
the errant children.
Some parents may, in fact, choose to call the police only as a last
resort when and if their children's behavior reaches the point at
which it threatens the health and peace of the entire family. In cer-
tain situations, parents may, depending on their assessment of their
children in relation to the family unit, determine police intervention
to be necessary. They may even believe that spending a short time in
jail would have a certain "shock" value to their children, helping to
steer them in the right direction. Parents make such choices with the
best long-term interests of their children and the entire family in
mind.
It is a question of conflicting goals: The asset forfeiture law seeks
to enforce the anti-drug laws and calls on property owners to make
valiant efforts toward that end. Parents, on the other hand, seek to
achieve the long-term goal of guiding family members away from
drugs and encouraging productive, law-abiding behavior. Most par-
ents will attempt to spare their children the potentially devastating
impact of criminal conviction and incarceration. Parents may also
reasonably believe that policing their children in the manner re-
quired by the courts will destroy the parent-child relationship.
The third option-requiring parents to throw their children out
of the house-poses another set of problems. First, for working class
parents, the suggestion that they evict their children may mean liter-
ally putting their children out on the street. If they fear loss of the
home to forfeiture, they cannot in good conscience send their chil-
dren to live with other relatives or friends because doing so would
simply transfer the risk of forfeiture to them.
Second, many of the children in forfeiture cases have drug addic-
tion problems.225 Although institutionalization in a residential treat-
ment facility would be an ideal solution for the family at risk of
forfeiture, this form of treatment may be prohibitively expensive for
225 See United States v. 19 & 25 Castle St., 31 F.3d 35, 37 (2d Cir. 1994); 4.14 Acres, 801
F. Supp. at 742; United States v. 908 T St., N.W., 770 F. Supp. 697, 703 (D.D.C. 1991).
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working class families, who may not have medical insurance coverage
for this service or the funds to pay for it outright. In addition, they
may not have access to public rehabilitation programs because of un-
availability or because they may not meet the indigency requirements
for such programs.
The eviction option thus presents a cruel irony of the forfeiture
rules as applied to families. Hard working, working-class people who
do well enough to buy a home for their family, but who are not
wealthy, cannot afford to send their children away for residential treat-
ment like a wealthy person can and even a poor person might. Work-
ing-class parents thus occupy the most vulnerable position when faced
with forfeiture of the family home. If a wealthy person's home is for-
feited, he or she will simply buy another. If a poor person who rents
an apartment or house is evicted, he or she can usually rent an-
other.2 26 Those in between these two extremes-usually single
mothers who may have struggled for years to stay above the poverty
line-lose everything they have invested in their homes and cannot
likely afford comparable housing.
What, then can lawmakers do to eliminate the unfairness of civil
asset forfeiture laws? Congress will not likely abolish the facilitation
provision for real property forfeitures any time soon,227 but a number
of less drastic amendments would protect innocent family members
from the loss of their homes. Congress could, for example, enact an
exception for the primary residences of family members who are not
themselves guilty of any drug offense. At a minimum, lawmakers
could give standing to innocent minor children whose homes become
subject to forfeiture.
To protect innocent spouses, Congress should amend the forfei-
ture laws to prohibit the partition of marital real property so that
uninvolved spouses are not penalized for the wrongdoing of their hus-
bands or wives. Such a rule would not protect the ill-gotten gains of
drug dealers since the cases suggest that the homes confiscated under
the civil asset forfeiture laws are not purchased with drug proceeds.
Nor would guilty spouses avoid punishment; they would be subject to
criminal prosecution for their offenses.
Even absent legislative change, however, the courts could re-
examine precedent on what steps are "reasonable," when one or more
226 Alternative housing for low-income people may not, of course, always exist. See,
e.g., United States v. 121 Nostrand Ave., 760 F. Supp. 1015, 1018 (E.D.N.Y 1991) (acute
shortage of low-priced housing may bring about homelessness for person evicted from
apartment); Richmond Tenants Org. Inc. v. Kemp, 758 F. Supp. 607, 608-09 (E.D. Va.
1990) (addressing eviction of public housing tenants whose apartments were used for drug
offenses).
227 See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text (discussing forfeitures of real proper-
ties that facilitate drug offenses).
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family members become involved in the drug trade. The case law
demonstrates a lack of awareness of important gender and class issues
created by the forfeiture rules. Courts should emulate those cases
that have contextualized the "reasonableness" analysis, considering
factors such as educational background, work schedule, and total
number of dependents, which may affect a parent's ability to supervise
the use of his or her property. Furthermore, courts should recognize
the value of preserving the family, and of showing maternal concern
for young children, as legitimate factors in evaluating the reasonable-
ness of a parent's response to drug offenses on his or her property. In
spousal property cases, the courts should similarly recognize the real-
ity of married life and the importance of maintaining marital bonds.
No woman should be required by law to either report her husband to
the police, or divorce him, because he has violated drug laws. In cases
of violent oppression by an abusive husband, the courts should not
expect a woman to take any measures that would endanger her or her
family. No woman should have to sacrifice her safety or that of her
children to further the government's war on drugs.
CONCLUSION
To the extent that forfeitures of drug-related assets remove drug
proceeds from drug offenders, they may further the goal of crippling
large-scale drug operations. But the forfeiture of homes used to "facil-
itate" drug offenses does not further this goal. The Supreme Court
observed that such forfeitures of real property serve primarily to pun-
ish, not to divest a person of ill-gotten gains. 228 Forfeitures of family
homes used as the site of a drug transaction therefore punish
uninvolved property owners as well as other uninvolved residents of
the home. In most cases, the innocent victims of family home forfeit-
ures are working-class, single mothers raising two generations of chil-
dren, or the wives and young children of men involved in the drug
trade. None of the cases have involved rich drug "kingpins."
We have lived with the present law long enough to see its unfortu-
nate results. Drug law enforcement has been pursued at the expense
of another essential goal: the preservation of the family. In weighing
the costs and benefits of the current system, it seems clear that the
time has come to put the family first. As the Supreme Court once
wrote:
The Court has long recognized that, because the Bill of Rights is
designed to secure individual liberty, it must afford the formation
and preservation of certain kinds of highly personal relationships a
228 Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2810-12 (1993).
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substantial measure of sanctuary from unjustified interference by
the State....
The personal affiliations . . . entitled to this sort of constitu-
tional protection, are those that attend the creation and sustenance
of a family-marriage; the raising and education of children; and
cohabitation with one's relatives. 229
229 Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618-19 (1984) (citations omitted).
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